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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, regulation of the insurance industry in the United
States has been left to the individual states. In an attempt to establish a
division between federal and state authority to regulate the insurance
industry, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945' ("the
Act"), which granted antitrust immunity to certain activities of
insurance companies. Based extensively on state law, the system of
insurance regulation established under the McCarran-Ferguson Act
cannot continue much longer, for it has created a patchwork system of
state regulatory schemes, a loss of competitiveness to firms that
compete internationally, and tangled bureaucratic and legal thickets for
consumers, regulators, and firms which deal across state lines. More
importantly, the current system has also resulted in ineffective
insurance regulation and a lack of affordable insurance protection for
major segments of our economy. On the other hand, suggestions of
federal regulation raise the specter of heavy-handed bureaucracy, lack
of flexibility, and a diminution of influence for thousands of small,
local insurance companies.
A series of insurance crises in the 1980s provided substantial fodder
for action by both consumer and legislative groups. 2 State legisla1. An Act to Express the Intent of Congress with Reference to the Regulation of the
Business of Insurance, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) ("McCarran-Ferguson Act") (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988)). For the pertinent text of the McCarranFerguson Act, see infra note 29.
2. The various insurance problems and crises began in the early 1980s and progressed
throughout the decade. See, e.g., Price-Cutting Bleeds the Casualty Insurers, BUSINESS
WEEK, Nov. 8, 1982, at 88-95; Resa W. King, The Coverage Crisis at Town Hall,
BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 26, 1985, at 72-75; The Insurance Crisis: Now Everyone is in a
Risky Business, BUSINESS WEEK, March 10, 1986, at 88-92; Christopher Farrell et al.,
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tures, in particular, jumped into the fray, providing what many believe
to be unfair and burdensome laws in some states and laws that unduly
favor insurance companies in other states.3 Moreover, strong elements
in Congress, reacting in part to the inability of the current system to
adequately regulate the insurance industry, have indicated a desire to
amend or even repeal the McCarran-Ferguson Act, thereby subjecting
the insurance industry to additional federal legislation, particularly the
antitrust laws under the Sherman Act.4 As demonstrated by these
recent legislative efforts to amend or even repeal the McCarranFerguson Act, the existing jerrybuilt scheme of insurance regulation
constructed under the McCarran-Ferguson Act has satisfied no one.
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court issued its long-awaited
opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California.5 This case
presented an opportunity for an expansion of congressional regulatory
power over the insurance industry through a broader interpretation of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act and provided some hope for a more
coherent and effective system of insurance regulation. The Court's
jumbled opinion, however, failed to seize that opportunity. Instead,
the Hartford FireInsurance case illustrated the impracticability of state
regulation of the insurance industry, and the Court's opinion emasculated the already limited ability of the federal government to regulate
the insurance industry. Thus, the HartfordFireInsurance opinion did
nothing to alter the confused and patchwork scheme of insurance regulation established by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
In the wake of the HartfordFire Insurance decision, it is time for a
The Crisis is Over-But Insurance Will Never Be the Same, BUSINESS WEEK, May 25,
1987, at 122-23; Ronald Grover et al., They're Watching This California Brawl from
Coast to Coast, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 15, 1988, at 34.
In the early 1990s the problem of insolvency came to the forefront. See, e.g., Jeffrey
A. Koeppel, The Insolvency Looking Glass, BEST'S REVIEW, Sept. 1991, at 23-30;
Evelyn Gilbert, Company Insolvencies Wreak Havoc, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Nov. 18,
1991, at 29.
3. Probably the best-known example of such a state law is Proposition 103, passed
in California in November 1988. Proposition 103 was a referendum that cut all automobile insurance rates in the state by 20%. Major regulatory overhauls, based in part on
Proposition 103, were considered or are underway in Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. See Eric Schine, It's Second and Ten for
Prop 103, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 11, 1991, at 68. Other states responded to the problems
differently by adopting various types of tort "reform" to restrict recoveries by injured
parties.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
5. 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993). The case has progressed through a series of names.
Before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the district court, it was called In re
Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'g 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D.
Cal. 1989).
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fresh look at the McCarran-Ferguson system of insurance regulation.
The world economy has become increasingly interdependent over the
past fifty years, and the financial community-including the insurance
industry-has led the way. The reinsurance and retrocessional insurance markets are now clearly global, as are markets for excess surplus
lines and other exceptional risks. Moreover, major American firms are
increasingly expanding their operations into foreign countries. Today,
the insurance industry is not a single industry, but rather a polyglot
group of separate industries and divisions of other financial institutions
that are not closely related to one another except by the common and
generic name "insurance." Regulation of these varied industries is
essential, and in many cases regulation should be consistent across the
nation, a requirement that generally calls for federal oversight. On the
other hand, regulation must also be flexible enough to accommodate
the heterogeneous demands of the various businesses we call
"insurance," for important aspects of the insurance industry demand
more local control and regulation than can be obtained through federal
action.'
The purpose of this article is to begin a dialogue toward that fresh
look. Part II reviews the history and background of insurance regulation in the United States, including the theories behind the grant of a
limited antitrust exemption to the insurance industry, the passage and
subsequent interpretations of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and
judicially created doctrines that limit federal authority to regulate the
insurance industry. Part II also considers the application of the "state
action" rule, which allows states to displace federal antitrust regulation
through state law, and the doctrine of international comity. Part III
traces the Hartford Fire Insurance case, including its jumbled
procedural history and complex holding, both of which derive, at least
in part, from the crazy-quilt compromise nature of the McCarranFerguson Act. Part IV analyzes the effect of the Supreme Court's
Hartford Fire Insurance decision on the McCarran-Ferguson Act
system of insurance regulation, summarizes the problems of insurance
regulation in the current hybrid environment, and urges that the current
system of insurance regulation be revised to reject complete control by
either the states or the federal government. This Article concludes by
taking the position that the system of insurance regulation should
embrace a creative use of uniform laws, interstate compacts, and
federally-mandated state regulation in a flexible and realistic manner.
6. For example, regulation and licensing of insurers and brokers are almost certainly
best accomplished by state authorities. Similarly, regulation of the thousands of small,
local mutual insurance companies is far more efficiently done at the state level.
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II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF INSURANCE REGULATION
IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT

The authority to regulate the insurance industry in the United States
has traditionally been within the province of the states rather than the
7
federal government. An early interpretation of the Commerce Clause
essentially barred the federal government from exercising authority
over the insurance industry and left this regulatory power to the
states.8 As the definition of "interstate commerce" and interpretations
of congressional power to regulate commerce pursuant to the
Commerce Clause evolved, it came to appear that the federal
government would in fact be able to regulate the insurance industry. 9
Congress responded by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act,' ° which
not only recognized the authority of the states to regulate the insurance
industry but also granted a limited exemption from federal antitrust
laws to the "business of insurance."" As a result of this regulatory
void and the McCarran-Ferguson Act's invitation to states to regulate
the insurance industry, states have enacted a wide variety of schemes
to tax and regulate the insurance business.
A.

CongressionalPower to Regulate the InsuranceIndustry

Any history of regulation of the insurance industry in the United
States must begin with Paul v. Virginia.12 In Paul, the United States
Supreme Court held that "[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce," and that the business of insurance was therefore
beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause. 13 A number of subsequent
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
8. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183-85 (1868) (holding that insurance
contracts "are not articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the word" and are
instead "local transactions ... governed by the local law"); see also infra part II.A.
9. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 541, 553
(1944) (recognizing that the business of insurance results in "a continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the states" and reasoning that "[n]o commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been held to be
wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause"); see also
infra part II.A.
10. Ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015

(1988)).
I 1. See §§ 2-3, 59 Stat. at 34.
12. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
13. Id. at 183. Explaining its refusal to characterize "contracts of insurance" as
commerce, the Paul Court stated:
These contracts are not articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the
word. They are not subjects of trade and barter offered in the market as something having an existence and value independent of the parties to them. They
are not commodities to be shipped or forwarded from one State to another, and
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cases reinforced the notion that insurance was outside federal regulatory power because 4it was not "commerce" within the meaning of the
Commerce Clause.'
The Supreme Court's initial interpretation of the Commerce Clause
precluded the federal government from regulating the insurance industry for nearly eighty years until 1944 when the Court decided the
seminal case of United States v. South-Eastern UnderwritersAss'n."5
In South-Eastern Underwriters, antitrust indictments were brought
against the South-Eastern Underwriters Association, its membership
of nearly two hundred private stock fire insurance companies, and
twenty-seven individuals for alleged violations of the Sherman Act. 6
The defendants challenged the indictments on the basis of Paul v.
Virginia and its progeny, arguing that in light of the Court's prior
holding that insurance contracts do not involve interstate commerce,
regulation of the insurance industry was beyond congressional
power.' 7 The South-Eastern Underwriters Court departed from its
prior characterization of "contracts of insurance," however, and held
that the business of insurance was indeed "commerce" within the
meaning of the Commerce Clause and that it therefore could be
regulated by the federal government.' 8 After reviewing the legislative
then put up for sale. They are like other personal contracts between parties
which are completed by their signature and the transfer of the consideration.
Such contracts are not inter-state transactions, though the parties may be
domiciled in different States. The policies do not take effect-are not executed
contracts-until delivered by the agent in Virginia. They are, then, local
transactions, and are governed by the local law. They do not constitute a part
of the commerce between the States any more than a contract for the purchase
and sale of goods in Virginia by a citizen of New York whilst in Virginia
would constitute a portion of such commerce.
Id. Thus, the Court effectively placed the insurance industry beyond the reach of federal
regulation and the Commerce Clause.
14. See, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 510
(1913) (holding that the business of insurance involves neither state nor interstate
commerce); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655 (1895) (holding that "[tihe business of insurance is not commerce"). These cases reflect the Court's restrictive interpretation of the Commerce Clause in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Given the
decisions by the courts in 1937 following Franklin Roosevelt's failed attempt to "pack"
the Supreme Court, a more expansive reading of the Commerce Clause was virtually
inevitable. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
15. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
1 6. Id. at 534. The parties were indicted for two alleged violations of the Sherman
Act: (I) a conspiracy to restrain interstate trade and commerce by fixing premiums on
certain lines of insurance; and (2) a conspiracy to monopolize trade and commerce in
those same lines of insurance. Id. at 534-35.
17. Id. at 536, 543-45.
1 8. South-Eastern Underwriters,322 U.S. at 553. The Court noted that in every case
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history of the Sherman Act, the Court concluded that Congress did not
intend to exempt insurance companies from the application of the
Sherman Act.' 9 Thus, following South-Eastern Underwriters, it
appeared that the federal government did indeed have the power to
regulate the insurance industry through the antitrust laws. Moreover,
and perhaps most disturbing to the insurance industry, South-Eastern
Underwriters made it clear that Congress could pass legislation
specifically for the purpose of regulating the insurance industry.
B. Theories of Exemptionfor the Insurance Industry
Although robust competition is the theoretical norm for both capitalism and the antitrust laws,2' completely unrestricted competition can
sometimes result in specific abuses and structural problems that may in
fact threaten capitalism. As a result, a variety of regulatory schemes
have been developed in various industries to eliminate or soften any
specific abuses or structural problems.
Commentators have recognized that the unique nature of the insurance industry presents special regulatory problems, particularly with
regard to the effect of competition within the industry. For instance, it
has often been argued that vigorous competition in the insurance
industry would lead to inadequate premium rates and the insolvency of
many insurance companies. 2 Rate competition would allegedly lead
to inadequate rate levels, rate discrimination, and insolvency, thereby
in which it had held that "the business of insurance is not commerce," it had been faced
with the issue of the validity of a state statute regulating the insurance industry. Id. at
544. In fact, the Court had never before addressed the validity of an attempt by Congress
to regulate the insurance industry. Id. Accordingly, the Court noted that its prior
characterizations of insurance as outside the scope of "commerce" had occurred in cases
where the Court was evaluating state rather than federal regulations, and observed that
such characterizations were "inconsistent with many decisions of [the] Court which have
upheld federal statutes regulating interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause." Id.
at 545 (footnote omitted).
19. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 560-61.
20. One must remember that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to foster capitalism,
not restrict it:
The American antitrust laws are essentially conservative in nature. Their
purpose is to maintain free competition by insuring that such competition is
fair. They seek to prevent giant aggregations of economic power from being
built unfairly, because the use of such power necessarily stifles the opportunities competitors will have to compete meaningfully. In summary, the
antitrust laws seek to prevent conduct which weakens or destroys competition.
EARL W. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 15 (2d ed. 1973).
21. Earl W. Kintner et al., Application of the Antitrust Laws to the Activities of
Insurance Companies: Heavier Risks, Expanded Coverage, and Greater Liability, 63
N.C. L. REV. 431, 432 (1985).
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resulting in "financial chaos and public injury. ' 22 As one authority on
antitrust has observed:
A substantial part of the problem is that an insurer may have
difficulty assessing the risks involved and hence the magnitude
of claims that it may have to pay. Thus, although premiums
define the insurer's income, its costs or expenses are far less
predictable. If an insurer underestimates the claims it will have
to pay, it may not have sufficient funds to pay them. This
uncertainty will lead either to a lack of adequate coverage,
insolvency of the company, or both.2 3
To address these problems, insurance companies often base their rates
on actuarial and statistical projections of loss. Rating organizations in
the property and casualty insurance industry obtain loss data from
member firms and provide loss projections to their member companies. Arguably, such statistical sharing provides more stability for
insurance companies and more precise rates for consumers. 24
The principle rating bureau for the property and liability insurance
field is the Insurance Services Office (ISO), a national rating bureau
that computes rates for most lines of property and liability insurance.25
Although no such organization exists in the life insurance industry, the
Society of Actuaries likewise exchanges information among its
members, thus performing much the same function.26 Nevertheless,
22. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 561; see also JOHN G.
REGULATION OF INSURANCE INTHE UNITED STATES

DAY,

ECONOMIC

18 (1970) (noting that "[rate setting in

concert" has historically been the insurance industry's answer to the perceived dangers
of inadequate rate levels, rate discrimination, and insolvency).
Nevertheless, one commentator argues that the insurance industry is in fact quite
competitive for two reasons: (1) that there is a significant portion of the market that is
controlled by nonbureau companies that develop their own rates and price their products
individually; and (2) bureau pricing simply moves competition from price to underwriting. That is, while the price charged to consumers may be fixed, insurer's costs may
vary from those on which the bureau's rates are predicted, so insurers alter their underwriting standards by insuring or rejecting riskier activities at the same cost. See EMMEFr
J.VAUGHN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 97 (6th ed. 1992).
23. Kintner et al., supra note 21, at 433 n.10.
24. VAUGHN, supra note 22, at 75.
25. Id. at 94. In May of 1989, however, ISO announced its decision to stop providing advisory rates to its members and to provide only trended loss costs. Consequently,
companies will be required to develop their own factors for expenses, profits and
contingencies. Id. at 97. This change was adopted, at least in part, due to criticisms that
the activities of rating bureaus consisted of price-fixing behavior and that such cooperation among insurance companies indicated the possible existence of a cartel. Id.
26. The Society of Actuaries is a professional organization of life and health insurance actuaries. The organization, like many professional groups, has a number of meetings and proceedings and produces research papers and publications that provide for an
exchange of actuarial information and for the establishment of standards for their
profession.
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the uncertainty in assessing risk and potential claims is undoubtedly
more serious for property and liability insurers than for health or life
insurers, for the latter insurers have the advantage of actuarial tables,
health statistics, and other predictors that make their risk assessment
far easier.
C. CongressionalRegulation of the Insurance Industry:
The McCarran-FergusonAct
In 1945, following the Court's ruling in South-Eastern
Underwritersand as a result of lobbying by the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC"),28 Congress passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 29 The concerns that prompted the enactment
27. Kintner et al., supra note 21, at 433 n.10. Consequently, it may be argued that
health and life insurers may be less deserving of antitrust immunity. Id.
28. See Julia M. Melendez, The McCarran-FergusonAct: Has It Outlived Its Intent?
42 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 283, 286-87 (1992); see also Charles D. Weller, The
McCarran-FergusonAct's Antitrust Exemption for Insurance: Language, History and
Policy, 1978 DUKE L. J. 587, 592 (noting that Congress considered legislation regarding federal regulation of the insurance industry even prior to the Court's decision in
South-Eastern Underwriters). For an exhaustive analysis of the legislative history of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Weller, supra.
29. Ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(1988)). The current version of the Act provides in pertinent part:
§ 10 11. Declaration of policy
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that
silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to
the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
§1012. Regulation by State law; Federal law relating specifically to insurance; applicability of certain Federal laws after June 30, 1948
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance ... unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance:
Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended,
known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended,
known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the
Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
law.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1012 (1988).
Section 3(b) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation.
15 U.S.C. § 1013(b).
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of the McCarran-Ferguson Act appear to have been threefold: first,
that the application of the antitrust laws to the insurance industry was
wholly inappropriate and that an exemption from those laws was
required to protect insurers from criminal antitrust liability; second,
that state schemes taxing and regulating insurance would be found to
violate the Commerce Clause as the Court had interpreted it in SouthEastern Underwriters;and third, that legislation was needed to erect a
barrier against the perceived threat that the "activist Roosevelt administration" would federalize insurance regulation and wrest control from
the states.3 °
In view of these concerns, Congress provided in the McCarranFerguson Act that federal antitrust laws would apply to the business of
insurance, but only in specific circumstances. 31 Under McCarranFerguson, Congress gave the insurance industry a conditionalexemption from federal antitrust laws. The McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts
only (1) the business of insurance; (2) to the extent that such business
is regulated by state law; and (3) so long as no boycott, intimidation,
or coercion takes place. 32 The limited nature of this exemption is illustrated by the legislative history of a bill that Congress considered and
rejected before it adopted McCarran-Ferguson.
Immediately prior to the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
Congress had considered the Walter-Hancock bill,33 which would
have completely exempted the insurance industry from federal antitrust
laws. The Walter-Hancock bill passed the House and initially passed
As adopted, the Act is deceptively simple in form; however, it touches issues affecting
the entire insurance industry and the regulatory schemes of all of the states as well as
that of the federal government.
30. Weller, supra note 28, at 590-91.
3 1. Soon after enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Supreme Court described
the Act's purpose:
Obviously Congress' purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and
future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance. This
was done in two ways. One was by removing obstructions which might be
thought to flow from its own power, whether dormant or exercised, except as
otherwise expressly provided in the Act itself or in future legislation. The
other was by declaring expressly and affirmatively that continued state regulation and taxation of this business is in the public interest and that the business and all who engage in it "shall be subject to" the laws of the several
states in these respects.
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429-30 (1946).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1013. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S.
531, 539 (1978), discussed infra notes 54-70 and accompanying text; SEC v. National
Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 458-60 (1969), discussed infra notes 49-53 and accompanying
text; FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560, 563 (1958), discussed infra notes 4748 and accompanying text.
33. H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943).
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the Senate, but the Senate later reconsidered and rejected the bill.34
Shortly thereafter, Congress adopted the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
which was the replacement bill for Walter-Hancock. Significantly,
McCarran-Ferguson contained a provision that the rejected WalterHancock bill had not: that the federal antitrust laws would indeed
apply to the business of insurance in specific instances.35 This limited
exemption from the antitrust laws is a far cry from the absolute
exemption that the Walter-Hancock bill had embraced. Therefore, the
adoption of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which Congress passed in
lieu of the Walter-Hancock bill, reflects Congress's view that the
states' authority to regulate the business of insurance is not exclusive.36 The conditional and ambiguous nature of the insurance industry's limited exemption has become the basis for much litigation,
including the Hartford Fire Insurance case, and is the focus of this
Article.
D. ErodingState Power: Judicial Treatment of the McCarranFergusonAct Priorto Hartford Fire Insurance
Over the years, judicial examination of the McCarran-Ferguson Act
has focused on three major issues: (1) the nature of the Act's
"business of insurance" exemption; 37 (2) the division of regulatory
34. See 90 Cong. Rec. 6565, 8054 (1943).
35. See §§ 2-3, 59 Stat. at 34. The provision of a conditional exemption was
partially a result of lobbying efforts by the NAIC, which sought both continued state
regulation of the insurance industry and the application of the antitrust laws to conduct
not necessary for the welfare of policy owners. Melendez, supra note 28, at 286. Stock
insurance companies opposed any application of federal antitrust laws to the business of
insurance and preferred the Walter-Hancock bill. Id. These opposing views demonstrate
that the insurance industry is neither monolithic nor unanimous. There are dozens of
types of insurance, including health, life, auto, property, worker's compensation,
casualty, liability and others, and sub-groups within each type. Stock companies differ
widely from mutual companies. Various insurance professionals, including brokers and
producers, primary insurers, reinsurers, and retrocessional insurers, often have differing
interests. Companies range in size from small "Mom and Pop" local mutuals to giants
of the industry. Additionally, there are an incredible number of professional organizations, continuing education programs, industry groups, lobbying organizations and
other groups. To assume that any common interest exists within this group is extremely
risky, and probably inaccurate.
36. See Melendez, supra note 28, at 287. It is also possible that the historical
purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was simply to codify the existing state action
doctrine under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See Weller, supra note 28, at 61519. See infra part II.F.1 for a discussion of Parker v. Brown and the state action
doctrine.
37. See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982), discussed infra
notes 85-86 and accompanying text; Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,
440 U.S. 205 (1979), discussed infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
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authority between the states and the federal government; 38 and (3) the
definition of the terms "boycott, coercion, or intimidation. 39
Although the Court's recent decision in Hartford Fire Insurance
focused primarily on the third of these issues, the Court has previously
considered the first two issues at length.
In the course of its examination of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the
Supreme Court has sought to balance the degree to which federal and
state governments may regulate the business of insurance. Although
the Court's decisions have often centered on rather specific issues of
statutory interpretation, the historical trend of the Court has been to
move away from state regulation and to recognize greater federal regulatory power over the insurance industry. The high water mark of
federal regulation may have come and gone, however, for in Hartford
FireInsurance the Court placed some limits on federal authority.'
The Court first examined the McCarran-Ferguson Act in Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Benjamin,4 in which it considered the division
between state and federal authority to regulate the insurance industry as
it upheld a South Carolina tax on out-of-state insurers.42 In Benjamin,
Prudential Insurance Co., a New Jersey corporation, challenged a
South Carolina law that taxed premiums received by foreign insurance
companies from business done in South Carolina.43 Prudential
contended that because the statute did not place a similar tax on premiums paid to domestic insurers, it violated the Commerce Clause by
discriminating against interstate commerce.44 The Court rejected
Prudential's argument and noted that the McCarran-Fergueson Act did
not require uniformity of regulation and taxation with respect to the
insurance industry.45
Following Benjamin, the Supreme Court had no occasion to interpret the Act for about a decade. Later cases affirmed state authority to
38. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), discussed infra notes 49-53
and accompanying text; FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958), discussed
infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S.
408 (1946), discussed infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
39. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978), discussed infra
notes 54-70 and accompanying text.
40. For a thorough discussion of the way in which the Hartford Fire Insurance
decision limits federal authority to regulate the insurance industry, see infra part III.
41. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
42. See id. at 427-40.
43. Id. at 410.
44. Id. at411.
45. See Benjamin, 328 U.S. at 431, 433-36. The Benjamin Court also recognized
that Congress's power over interstate commerce includes, with some limitation, the
power to discriminate against interstate commerce and in favor of local trade. Id. at 434.
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regulate and tax the insurance industry and, to some degree, countered
fears that states would be stripped of the power to regulate and tax. 46
For example, in FTC v. National Casualty Co.,4 the Court held that
the Federal Trade Commission did not have authority .to regulate
advertising of insurance at a local level because such matters had
effectively been left to the states. 48
Beginning in 1969, the Court began to recognize greater federal
regulatory power over the insurance industry. In SEC v. National
Securities, Inc.,49 the Court addressed the argument that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act prohibited the SEC from bringing an action
for fraud under the federal Securities Exchange Act against the
controlling shareholder of an insurance company. 50 The controlling
shareholder argued that because the state director of insurance found,
pursuant to a state statute, that a proposed merger would not be
inequitable to the shareholders of the insurance companies involved in
the merger, the SEC could not supersede state law by suing under the
federal Securities Exchange Act. 5' The Court distinguished between
"insurance" regulation and "securities" regulation and found the latter
not to be within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.5 2 Because
the Court found that the state statute constituted an attempt to protect
purchasers of securities rather than purchasers of insurance policies, it
held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar the SEC from bringing the action.53
The Court again recognized federal regulatory power over the insur-

46. See Francis Achampong, The McCarran-Ferguson Act and the Limited Insurance
Antitrust Exemption: An Indefensible Aberration? 15 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 141, 150
(1991).
47. 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
48. Id. at 564; see also Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310
(1955) (rejecting an insurer's contention that federal admiralty law controlled a case
involving a claim on a marine insurance contract and holding instead that Texas law
governed); Weller, supra note 28, at 599-600. But see SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959). In Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., the Court ruled by a five-tofour margin that variable annuities were not "insurance" within the meaning of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act and therefore could be regulated by the federal authorities. See
id. at 71-73. The narrow margin and rather convoluted means by which the Court held
that the Securities and Exchange Commission had authority to regulate the variable
annuities indicates the reverence with which state authority over insurance was viewed in
the 1950s.
49. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
50. Id. at 455-57.
51. Id. at 457.
52. Id. at 460.
53. Id.
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ance industry in St. PaulFire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry,54 the
case in which the Supreme Court first defined the term "boycott"
within the context of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In Barry, a group
of Rhode Island physicians and patients brought an antitrust action
against four insurance companies that sold medical malpractice insurance." The complaint alleged that three of the four insurance companies-the only providers of medical malpractice insurance in the
state-had refused to accept applications for insurance from the
policyholders of the fourth insurer in an attempt to compel them to
submit to new policy provisions established by the fourth insurer.56 In
effect, policyholders of the fourth insurer who would not submit to the
changes were thereby precluded from obtaining coverage from any
insurer in Rhode Island.57
The Barry plaintiffs alleged that this scheme amounted to a boycott
that was not immunized from federal antitrust scrutiny by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 58 The defendants, however, argued that the
term "boycott," as used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, "should be
limited to cases where concerted refusals to deal are used to exclude or
penalize insurance companies or other traders which refuse to conform
their competitive practices to terms dictated by the conspiracy., 59 After
the court of appeals reversed the district court's decision to dismiss the
complaint,6" the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
meaning of the term "boycott" in the context of the McCarranFerguson Act.6 '
The Supreme Court began its analysis by tracing the language and
54. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
55. Id. at 533.
56. Id. The major changes sought by the fourth insurer included the elimination of
coverage on an "occurrence" basis and the limiting of coverage on a "claims-made"
basis. Id. at 535. Note the similarity to the motivation and the desired policy changes
in the HartfordFire Insurance case.
57. Id. at 553.
58. Barry, 438 U.S. at 533-36.
59. Id. at 540 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 13, Barry (No. 77-240)).
60. Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 1977). In
granting the defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court concluded that the conduct
did not amount to a boycott under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, stating instead that "the
purpose of the boycott, coercion, and intimidation exception was solely to protect
insurance agents or other insurance companies from being 'black-listed' by powerful
combinations of insurance companies, not to affect the insurer-insured relationship."
See Barry, 438 U.S. at 536 (quoting the district court's unpublished opinion). The court
of appeals reversed, assigning the term "boycott" its "normal Sherman Act scope" by
defining the term as any "concerted refusal to deal" with a disfavored purchaser or seller.
Barry, 555 F.2d at 7.
61. See Barry, 438 U.S. at 534.
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history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.6 2 The Court then reasoned that
the term "boycott" should be interpreted in light of its traditional
63
meaning, as elaborated by decisions interpreting the Sherman Act.
Based upon its analysis of those decisions, the Court concluded that
under the traditional antitrust meaning of the term, the defendant's
activities indeed constituted a "boycott. '
The Barry Court also considered whether the legislative history of
the Act indicated that Congress intended to attach a special meaning to
the word "boycott" apart from its established Sherman Act meaning.65
After discussing a number of specific legislative comments by key
representatives, the Court emphasized that section 3(b) of the Act
contained broad and unqualified language.66 The Court reasoned that
had Congress intended to preclude policyholders from bringing
Sherman Act claims by limiting the term "boycott" to the activities of
competing insurance companies, it would have explicitly stated this
62. Id. at 541.
63. Id. The Court examined numerous cases defining boycott in the context of federal
antitrust actions, including Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika
Linien, 390 U.S. 238 (1968); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127
(1966); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co. 221 U.S. 418
(1911); and Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). See Barry, 438 U.S. at 541-46.
64. Barry, 438 U.S. at 545. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Powell authored a
passage for the majority that became the source of debate between the district court and
the court of appeals in the Hartford Fire Insurance case:
Whatever other characterizations are possible, petitioners' conduct fairly may
be viewed as "an organized boycott[]" of St. Paul's policyholders. Solely for
the purpose of forcing physicians and hospitals to accede to a substantial
curtailment of the coverage previously available, St. Paul induced its competitors to refuse to deal on any terms with its customers. This agreement did not
simply fix rates or terms of coverage; it effectively barred St. Paul's policyholders from all access to alternative sources of coverage and even from negotiating for more favorable terms elsewhere in the market. The pact served as a
tactical weapon invoked by St. Paul in support of a dispute with its policyholders. The enlistment of third parties in an agreement not to trade, as a
means of compelling capitulation by the boycotted group, long has been
viewed as conduct supporting a finding of unlawful boycott.
Id. at 544-45 (citations omitted). Despite this broad statement, the Court rejected the
idea that the McCarran-Ferguson Act's use of the term "boycott" was coextensive with
that of the Sherman Act. See id. at 545 n.18.
65. Barry, 438 U.S. at 545-50. The Court noted that the congressional debates "make
clear that the 'boycott' exception was viewed by the Act's proponents as an important
safeguard against the danger that insurance companies might take advantage of purely
permissive state legislation to establish monopolies and enter into restrictive agreements falling outside the realm of state-supervised cooperative action." Id. at 547.
66. Id. at 550.

318

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 25

intention. 67 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Act covers any
act constituting a boycott, coercion, or intimidation 68 and that the term
"is not limited to concerted activity against insurance companies or
agents or, more generally, against competitors of members of the
boycotting group. 69 In light of this broad definition of the term
"boycott," the Court held that the actions of the defendant insurers in
Barry constituted a boycott within the meaning of the McCarranFerguson Act.7°
The trend toward recognizing greater federal regulatory power over
the insurance industry continued in Group Life & Health Insurance
Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,7 in which the Court clarified the meaning of
the term "business of insurance" within McCarran-Ferguson. 72 In
Royal Drug, a group of independent pharmacies alleged that defendant
Blue Shield, a Texas insurance company, and three pharmacies had
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to fix prices of
prescription drugs. 73 The alleged conspiracy involved "Pharmacy
Agreements," under which Blue Shield's reimbursement scheme
effectively allowed participating pharmacies to offer prescription drugs
to customers at a lower price than the independent pharmacies could.74
To determine whether the agreements violated federal antitrust laws,
the Court questioned whether the agreements constituted a part of the
"business of insurance," within which Blue Shield would be immu75
nized from federal antitrust laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Noting the express language of the Act, the Court concluded that the
Act specifically exempts the "business of insurance" and not "the business of insurers":
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Barry, 438 U.S. at 552.
70. Id. at 554.
71. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
72. Id. at 232-33.
73. Id. at 207. The independent pharmacies also claimed that the alleged conspiracy
caused an unlawful group boycott by Blue Shield policyholders. id.
74. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 209. Under the agreements, the participating pharmacies would furnish prescription drugs to Blue Shield policyholders at $2.00, and Blue
Shield would then reimburse those pharmacies for their cost of acquiring the drugs. Id.
Thus, Blue Shield policyholders paid only $2.00 for prescription drugs at participating
pharmacies. Id. In contrast, at nonparticipating pharmacies, the policyholders paid the
full price for prescription drugs, and Blue Shield would reimburse the policyholders for
75% of the drug price over $2.00. Id. As a result, only those nonparticipating
pharmacies that could afford to sell prescription drugs for less than the $2.00 mark-up
could profitably provide drugs to Blue Shield policyholders. Id.
75. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 210.
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The statute did not purport to make the States supreme in
regulating all the activities of insurance companies; its language
refers not to the persons or companies who are subject to state
regulation, but to laws "regulating the business of insurance."
Insurance companies may do many things which are subject to
paramount federal regulation; only when they are engaged in
the "business of insurance" does the statute apply.
The Royal Drug Court then analyzed the agreements to determine
whether they fell within the McCarran-Ferguson exemption and
concluded that for several reasons, the actual agreements did not
constitute the "business of insurance." First, the Court noted that the
most basic aspect of an insurance contract is the "spreading and
underwriting of a policyholder's risk ' 77 and concluded that the
Pharmacy Agreements, which were merely a mechanism for Blue
Shield to purchase goods and services cheaply, did not fall within that
definition.78 Indeed, the Court concluded that the agreements were
"legally indistinguishable from countless other business arrangements
that may be made by insurance companies to keep their costs low and
thereby also keep low the level of premiums charged to their policyholders.

79

The Court also noted that the congressional intent underlying the
McCarran-Ferguson Act focused on the relationship between insurer
and insured, and any additional "activities of insurance companies
[that] relate so closely to their status as reliable insurers that they, too,
must be placed in the same class." 80 At best, the Court concluded,
Blue Shield had shown a cost savings that could be passed on to its
policyholders. 8' Moreover, the legislative history clearly demonstrated
that such collateral agreements were not intended to qualify as the
"business of insurance." References in congressional debates
indicated that in permitting the exemption from federal antitrust laws
under McCarran-Ferguson, Congress was primarily concerned with
the underwriting of risks and with permitting intra-industry cooperation for statistical and rate-making purposes. 82 Finally, the Court
76. Id. at 211 (quoting National Securities, 393 U.S. at 459-60).
77. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 211.
78. Id. at 214.
79. Id. at 215.
80. Id. at 215-16 (quoting SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969)).
81. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 216.
82. Id. at 220-22. Moreover, at the time of the McCarran-Ferguson debates, health
insurers "were not considered to be engaged in the insurance business at all." Id. at 226.
In fact, to avoid state regulation, Blue Cross and Blue Shield historically took the position that they were not insurance companies. Id. at 229.
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stated that both implicit and explicit statutory exemptions from the
antitrust laws should be narrowly construed. 3 The Court then held
that the agreements did not constitute a part of the "business of insurance" and consequently were not within the McCarran-Ferguson
exemption from the federal antitrust laws. 4
More recently, in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno,8 5 the
Supreme Court enumerated specific criteria for determining what
constitutes the "business of insurance":
[F]irst, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is
an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer
and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to
entities within the insurance industry.86

Thus, the trend from the late 1960s through 1982 reveals a gradual
increase in federal authority and a consequent decrease in state authority to regulate the insurance industry. The Court's early interpretations
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, beginning with Benjamin in 1946 and
continuing through FTC v. National Casualty Co. in 1958, appear to
have favored the exercise of state regulatory power. Beginning with
National Securities in 1969, however, the cases reveal the Court's
increasing willingness to favor the use of federal authority.
E. Proposalsfor Legislative Reform of McCarran-Ferguson
Recently, the McCarran-Ferguson Act has come under increasing
scrutiny from legislative, judicial, and academic sources.87 Some
83. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 231. According to the Court, a narrow construction of
the antitrust exemption provided under McCarran-Ferguson would be particularly appropriate in cases involving agreements outside the insurance industry. Id. The Court
stated that an exempt party forfeits its antitrust exemption whenever it acts in concert
with nonexempt parties. Id.
84. Id. at 232-33.
85. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
86. Id. at 129. In Pireno, the Court held that a health insurer's use of a professional
association's peer review committee to examine chiropractic bills and render opinions
was not the "business of insurance" under the Act, and that federal antitrust laws could be
applied to the defendant's conduct. Id. at 134.
87. The Act has been criticized for at least two decades. See Weller, supra note 28, at
588 & n. 11 (citing commentators advocating modification or repeal of the Act); U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE (1977); Laurence M.
Hamric, Note, The McCarran-FergusonAct: A Time for Procompetitive Reform, 29
VAND. L. REV. 1271, 1308 (1976) (concluding that insurance regulation under the Act
has failed to protect consumers). For a thorough examination of the debate regarding the
success and failure of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see Achampong, supra note 46, at
141; Jay Angoff, Insurance Against Competition: How the McCarran-FergusonAct
Raises Pricesand Profits in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry, 5 YALE J. ON REG.
397 (1988); Melendez, supra note 28; William A. Montgomery, Changing Insurance
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contend that the Act stifles competition in prices and insurance terms,
which, in turn, results in higher premiums and a lack of policy options
for consumers. 88 To some extent, lack of federal antitrust oversight
assumes the existence of effective state regulation, which, critics
argue, is often either nonexistent, ineffective, or a victim of regulatory
"capture" by insurance companies.89 Together, the antitrust exemption
and the lack of effective state regulation has arguably resulted in a
shortage of affordable liability insurance.' ° These concerns are likely
to be the subject of continued debate in the wake of the Court's recent
HartfordFire Insurance decision. 9'
A series of legislative proposals that would have either limited or
repealed the McCarran-Ferguson Act received Congressional attention
during the early 1990s, 92 and even though none of these proposals
was successful, Congress remains interested in regulatory reform of
the insurance industry. 93 The proposed "Insurance Competitive
Policies: Coping with the New Antitrust Environment, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 313 (1993);
Nancy R. Page, Comment, Risky Business: Consumer Protection in the Insurance
Industry, 23 HARV. J.ON LEGIS. 287 (1986); Kevin Thompson, McCarran-Ferguson
Repeal and ISO's Advisory Rate Ban: A Chance for Compromise? 17 N. KY. L. REV. 373
(1990).
88. See 137 CONG. REC. E38 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991) (statement of Rep. Brooks)
(noting that "skyrocketing premiums and cutoffs in coverage are now an all too familiar
experience in many Americans' everyday lives" and that "the continuation of this
special treatment for the insurance industry [under the McCarran-Ferguson Act] has
become a proposition virtually impossible to defend'); see also Melendez, supra note
28, at 300 (discussing the Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1991, H.R. 9, 102d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1991), a bill that was intended to modify the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
and noting the remarks made by Rep. Brooks in support of the bill).
89. See Melendez, supra note 28, at 303-04 (outlining arguments by proponents for
repeal of the Act). Regulatory capture is the phenomenon of a state agency being unduly
influenced by the very interests being regulated. The regulated interests may, under
these circumstances, use the regulatory mechanisms for their own purposes. See ALAN
STONE, REGULATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 229-31 (1982) (describing the capture theory
of regulatory politics).
90. Melendez, supra note 28, at 304.
91. 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993). In Hartford Fire Insurance, the Court ruled on three
principal issues: (i) whether insurers lose their McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity
merely by acting in concert with nonexempt entities (in this case foreign insurers); (2)
whether international comity requires American courts to decline jurisdiction over cases
such as this; and (3) whether the insurers had engaged in a "boycott" as defined and used
in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Id. at 2901, 2908-11. The Hartford Fire Insurance case
is discussed in detail infra part III.
92. See, e.g., The Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1991, H.R. 9, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991). Such legislative proposals were deferred partially in anticipation of
the HartfordFire Insurance decision.
93. See Achampong, supra note 46, at 167-68; Montgomery, supra note 87, at 32628 (discussing the Insurance Competitive Pricing Act of 1991 and the Federal Insurance
Solvency Act of 1992).
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Pricing Act of 1991" 94 ("H.R. 9") would have eliminated the exemption from the antitrust laws for four specific activities: (1) price fixing;
(2) geographic market allocation; (3) tying arrangements; and (4)
monopolization.95 Joint collection of necessary historical and loss
development data would have continued to receive an exemption, 96 and
a later amendment would have permitted "small and medium-sized
companies, with small market shares... to continue to share trending
information used in determining insurance rates. ' 97
The National Association of Independent Insurers ("NAIl")
opposed H.R. 9 because it believed that the bill would result in
litigation over the new provisions, force small insurers out of business, and drive premiums higher. 98 The NAIC similarly opposed
H.R. 9 as did the American Insurance Association ("AIA").9 The
American Bar Association, however, endorsed the legislation.U°° Not
surprisingly, the Bush Administration opposed H.R. 9 on the ground
that the legislation would deter competitive collective action among
insurers.' O' H.R. 9 never reached the House floor, and the grant of
certiorari in the Hartford Fire Insurance case slowed°2 any further
legislative efforts to revise the McCarran-Ferguson Act.'
Another piece of proposed legislation, the "Federal Insurance
Solvency Act of 1993,"'0' sponsored by Representative John Dingell,

would limit federal oversight of the insurance industry by providing
94. H.R. 9, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. (1991).
95. See Montgomery, supra note 87, at 326; Margo D. Belier, Brooks Reintroduces
Bill to End Antitrust Immunity, J.OF COM., Jan. 7, 1993, at 8A(1). A similar bill was
proposed in the Senate, see S. 430, 102d Cong. 1st Sess. (1991), exempting virtually
the same activities as H.R. 9. The primary distinction between H.R. 9 and S. 430 was a
transition period in H.R. 9 providing an exemption for computing anticipated losses for
future years. Montgomery, supra note 87, at 327 n.83.
96. See Montgomery, supra note 87, at 327.
97. Melendez, supra note 28, at 300 n.107.
98. Id. at 301.
99. Id. at 301-02. The AIA in fact attempted to reach a compromise with the House
Judiciary Committee over antitrust provisions. See Editorial Comment, AIA Did Right
by McCarran,NAT'L UNDERWRITER, June 29, 1992 at 28 (discussing AIA's attempts at
compromise).
100. Melendez, supra note 28, at 303.
101. See Montgomery, supra note 87, at 327.
102. Id. It is unlikely that McCarran-Ferguson reform will rank high on the
Congressional agenda in the near future, principally because Congress is so occupied
with the issue of health insurance. See Mark A. Hofmann, Insurer Regulation Bills on
Back Burner: Little Action Seen on Dingell Plan, McCarranReform, Bus. INS., Feb. 22,
1993, at 3.
103. H.R. 1290, 103d Cong., ist Sess. (1993). A previous version of this bill, H.R.
4900, was introduced in 1992 during the 102nd Congress. See H.R. REP. No. 417, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 122-23 (1994).
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property/casualty and life/health insurers the opportunity to obtain a
"certificate of solvency" from a newly established Federal Insurance
Solvency Commission, which would set solvency standards for both
American and foreign insurers. 4 Under the proposed scheme,
federally certified insurers would be exempt from state solvency
regulations but would remain subject to state rate, form, and market
conduct regulations, and would also be required to participate in state
residual market mechanisms.'0 5 One commentator has noted,
however, that a previous and very similar version of the Dingell Bill
"threaten[ed] total confusion to insurance antitrust because it [was]
silent as to how it would affect the application of the McCarranFerguson Act." 6
F. Legal DoctrinesAffecting FederalRegulation of Insurance
In addition to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, there are two judicially
created doctrines that affect the power of the federal government to
regulate insurance in the United States. Both the state action doctrine
and the consideration of international comity are well-established
checks on the application of the federal antitrust laws, and both were
raised by the defendants in HartfordFire Insurance.
1. The "State Action" Doctrine
The so-called "state action" doctrine is a long-standing judicial
exemption to the antitrust laws. Although courts have repeatedly
stated that the Sherman Act is designed to foster competition, competition alone does not always result in sound economic policy.'0 7 As a
result, the Supreme Court has determined that, in some instances, state
legislatures may reasonably conclude that competition should be sacrificed in favor of regulation.10 8 Thus, pursuant to the judicially created
state action doctrine, states may determine that a particular industry or
area of commerce requires some amount of regulation, and the state
104. See Montgomery, supra note 87, at 328.
105. Id. "Residual market mechanisms" include a variety of state schemes to make
insurance available to all consumers. For example, a number of states provide an
assigned risk pool into which auto insurance applicants, who cannot secure insurance
otherwise, are placed. Insurance companies are required, as a condition of doing
business in the state, to accept a certain percentage of these high-risk customers.
Sometimes rates are set by the state as well. Similar schemes exist for homeowners'
insurance and other property coverages.
106. Id. (commenting on H.R. 4900, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), a previous
version of Representative Dingell's bill).
107. STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 496-97 (1993).
108. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
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may, by enactment of an appropriate regulatory scheme, displace
federal antitrust regulation.'"
The Court first addressed the state action doctrine in Parker v.
Brown."o In Parker,a raisin producer challenged a California statute
that restricted or allocated the production of certain agricultural
products,"'I a scheme that would certainly be considered a conspiracy
to restrain trade under the Sherman Act if put into effect solely by
private parties." 2 Despite the relatively clear nature of the antitrust
violation, the Court held that the Sherman Act was not intended to
restrain activities directed by state legislatures." 13 In other words, state
legislatures may, by the adoption of appropriate regulatory schemes,
restrict competition in a manner that private industries may not." 14 The
Court concluded that in adopting and enforcing its program, the State
of California had neither entered into an agreement nor conspired to
restrain trade with any party.'" Rather, California had imposed its
program "as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not
undertake to prohibit.""' 6
While at first glance the Court's decision in Parker v. Brown
appears to permit states to protect state business from federal antitrust
regulation, the case has not been interpreted that broadly.' 7 In 1980,
the Court issued one if its most important interpretations of the state
109. See Ross, supra note 107, at 496-99.
110. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
111. Id. at 346.
112. Id. at 350.
113. Id. at 351.
114. The Court explained itsreasoning:
[A] state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
or by declaring that their action islawful, and
authorizing them to violate it,
we have no question of the state or itsmunicipality becoming a participant in
a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade. Here the
state command ... isnot rendered unlawful by the Sherman Act since, inview
of the latter's words and history, it must be taken to be a prohibition of individual and not state action.
Parker, 317 U.S. at 351-52 (citations omitted).

115. Id.
116. Id. at 352.
117. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 598 (1976) (concluding that a
utility's anticompetitive conduct was not required by state law and therefore not immune
from federal antitrust laws); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975)
(holding that for the state action exemption to apply, the acting party must show that a
state law required the party to engage in the challenged activity); Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 388 (1951) (holding that a Louisiana statute
enforcing a price-fixing agreement against both parties and nonparties to an agreement
did not insulate a resale price maintenance scheme by whiskey and gin distributors from
the federal antitrust laws).
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action doctrine. In CaliforniaRetail Liquor DealersAss'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.,"18 the Court addressed a Sherman Act challenge to a
California statute that required all wine producers, wholesalers, and
rectifiers to file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the state." 9
In cases where a producer failed to enter into such a contract, wholesalers were required to post a price schedule for that producer's
brands. 20 The statute prohibited state-licensed wine merchants from
at any price other than one set in accordance
selling wine to retailers
2'
statute.'
the
with
After observing that the system for wine pricing clearly constituted
resale price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act, the Court
considered whether the state's involvement in the price setting program
was sufficient to establish antitrust immunity under the state action
doctrine.122 The Court declared that Parkerand its progeny established
two standards for antitrust immunity: (1) the restraint must be
"'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy"'; and
(2) the State must actively supervise the challenged policy.' 23 The
Court determined that California had satisfied the first standard by
forthrightly stating its legislative policy to permit resale price maintenance. 24 The Court concluded, however, that the California system
did not satisfy the second standard, for the state had neither set the
prices nor examined the reasonableness of the prices which were
essentially set by private parties. 25 Rather, California merely authorized and enforced the price fixing. 126 Emphasizing that states cannot
give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act, the Court
concluded that "[t]he national policy in favor of competition cannot be
over what
thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement
127
arrangement.
price-fixing
private
a
is essentially
The Court reexamined the first prong of the Midcal test in Southern

118. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
119. Id. at 99.
120. Id.
12 1. Id. The Court noted that the state did not have direct control over wine prices
and did not review the reasonableness of the prices set by wine dealers. Id. at 99-100.
122. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 103.
123. Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S.
389, 410 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, J.)).
124. Id.
125. Id. The Court noted that California also failed to monitor market conditions and
had never reevaluated the program. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106.
126. Id. at 105.
127. Id. at 106.
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Motor CarriersRate Conference, Inc. v. United States.'28 In Southern
Motor Carriers,four states had authorized rival trucking companies to
agree on joint rates for intrastate trucking and then to file the rates for
approval with the individual state regulatory commissions. 129 The
issue confronting the Court was whether merely authorizing the truckers to agree satisfied Midcal's requirement of a clear expression of a
state policy to displace competition with regulation.' 3" The Court
broadened Midcal's first prong, holding that so long as a state sufficiently articulates its intent to adopt legislation that permits
anticompetitive conduct by regulated private parties, the first prong of
the Midcal standard is satisfied.' 3 ' Thus, even though the states
permitted rather than compelled anticompetitive behavior in Southern
Motor Carriers,the Court concluded that the challenged conduct was
immunized under Parkerv. Brown because the state legislation either
expressly approved the collective rate making
or intentionally displaced
32
competition by enacting price regulations.
The Court revisited the "active supervision" prong of the Midcal test
in Patrickv. Burget.133 In Patrick, a surgeon brought an antitrust
action against several physician members of a peer-review committee,
established pursuant to Oregon law, that had terminated the surgeon's
staff privileges. 34 Despite the state's involvement in creating the peerreview system, the Supreme Court held that the revocation was a
private decision not actively supervised by the state. 35 According to
the Court, the active supervision requirement ensures that "the stateaction doctrine will shelter only the particular anticompetitive acts of
private parties that, in the judgment of the State, actually further state
regulatory policies."'' 36 Therefore, Midcal's second prong is satisfied
only where state officials have and exercise the power to review and
approve particular anticompetitive acts of private parties. a7
The Court further refined the active supervision requirement in FTC
v.

Ticor Title Insurance Co.' 38 In Ticor, the Federal Trade

128. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
129. Id. at 50.
130. Id. at 55.
131. Id. at 60.
132. Id. at 58-65.
133. 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
134. Id. at 96-97.
135. Id. at 105.
136. Id. at 101 (citation omitted).
137. Id.
138. 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992). The case is particularly relevant to Hartford Fire
Insurance because it also concerns the application of the antitrust laws to the insurance
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Commission ("FTC") filed a complaint charging several title insurance
companies in four states with horizontal price-fixing by setting fees for
title searches and examinations in violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 139 State-licensed rating bureaus established uniform
rates and filed them with their respective states, each of which used a
"negative option" system to approve rate filings. 4 ' Under this
system, rates filed by the rating bureaus became effective unless the
State rejected them within a specified period of time, usually 30
days.' The Administrative Law Judge ("AL") determined that this
particular negative option system imposed only "minimal scrutiny" by
state regulators. 4 2 Accordingly, even though the FTC conceded on
review of the ALJ's decision that the first part of the Midcal standard-the articulation of a clear policy to permit anticompetitive
conduct-had been satisfied, it determined that the second prong,
which requires active
state supervision, had not been satisfied in any
143
of the four states.
The Ticor Court traced the history of the Midcal standards and
considered first whether "principles of federalism" justified a broad
interpretation of state action immunity. 44 The Court found a
"powerful refutation" of that argument because thirty-six states filed
briefs as amici curiae opposing a broad immunity rule. 145 The Court
agreed with the amici states and held that state action immunity arises
only where there is "real compliance with both parts of the Midcal
test."' 146 The Court rejected a more formalistic but less demanding
industry, and its holding may have in fact induced ISO to abandon its practice of filing
rates before state insurance departments.
139. Id. at 2172.
140. Id. at 2174.
141. Id.
142. Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2174. The AU rejected the McCarran-Ferguson defense, and
the Court did not question those determinations. Id.
143. Id. at 2175-76.
144. Id. at 2178.
145. Id.
146. Ticor, 112 S.Ct. at 2178. The Court explained why it agreed with the narrower
interpretation of the Midcal test advanced by the states:
If the States must act in the shadow of state-action immunity whenever they
enter the realm of economic regulation, then our doctrine will impede their
freedom of action, not advance it .... By adhering in most cases to fundamental and accepted assumptions about the benefits of competition within the
framework of the antitrust laws, we increase the States' regulatory flexibility.
.. Neither federalism nor political responsibility is well served by a rule that
essential national policies are displaced by state regulations intended to
achieve more limited ends. For States which do choose to displace the free
market with regulation, our insistence on real compliance with both parts of
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view of the "active supervision" rule enunciated by another court, 47
stating that a "mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate
substitute for a decision by the State."' 148 Applying this more stringent
standard, the Court determined that although the state schemes
provided the potential for state supervision, that potential "was not
realized in fact."' 149 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the "active
supervision" prong of Midcal was not satisfied, and that the title insurance companies were not entitled to immunity from the federal antitrust
laws under the state action doctrine.) 5
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia commented that even though
the Court's standard for "active supervision" would create uncertainty
for states, he saw no alternative. 5 ' Noting that the active supervision
doctrine itself had not been challenged, Justice Scalia expressed his
skepticism toward the Parkerv. Brown exemption, which he characterized as permitting "state-programmed private collusion."'' 52 In
dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Thomas, claimed that the majority's decision would require courts to
make normative judgments about whether a state's regulatory scheme
is "sufficiently active."'5 1 3 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Thomas, filed a separate dissent, contending that the decision would
unfairly burden state regulators and would probably eliminate the use
of negative option regulations5.
The state action doctrine is at best a complicating factor in the
the Midcal test will serve to make clear that the State is responsible for the
price fixing it has sanctioned and undertaken to control .... For States whose
object it is to benefit their citizens through regulation, a broad doctrine of
state-action immunity may serve as nothing more than an attractive nuisance
in the economic sphere.
Id.
147. See New England Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v. FTC, 908 F.2d 1064, 1071 (1st
Cir. 1990) (holding that the state action doctrine is satisfied "[w]here . . . the State's
program is in place, is staffed and funded, grants to State officials ample power and the
duty to regulate pursuant to declared standards of state policy, is enforceable in the
State's courts, and demonstrates some basic level of activity directed towards seeing that
the private actors carry out the State's policy and not simply their own policy").
148. Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2179.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2180. The Ticor Court distinguished the "negative option" scheme
approved in Southern Motor Carriers because, in that case, the government conceded
that the active supervision requirement had been met through regularly held hearings
that used the industry submissions as a starting point. Id. at 2179-80.
151. Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2180-81 (Scalia, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 2181 (Scalia, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 2182-83 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2183-84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Neither dissent considered the point
that 36 states had filed briefs as amici curiae requesting narrowerimmunity.
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regulation of the insurance industry. Though modified in Ticor, this
doctrine provides another limitation on the use of antitrust laws to
regulate the insurance industry. Indeed, under the state action
doctrine, states may be able to displace the effect of the antitrust laws
in insurance regulation, even in the absence of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.
At least one commentator has observed an intimate relationship
55
between the state action doctrine and the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
and even though the legislative history of the Act is quite clear in
stating that it was intended to "enunciate" the Parkerdoctrine,'5 6 only
one court has adopted that view.' 57
2. The Principle of International Comity
Courts have created a second doctrine that limits the effect of the
federal antitrust laws upon the insurance industry. Under the principle
of international comity, even if a court determines that it has subject
matter jurisdiction over an action against a foreign insurance company,
international comity may bar the exercise of that jurisdiction. 58 This
doctrine reflects the understanding that although the Sherman Act may
encompass the foreign activities of aliens as well as American citizens,
it may not be appropriate for federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction
in all situations. 59 Extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws, or
any laws for that matter, have the potential for causing international
resentment and protest, as well as undermining vital national interests
abroad. 60 In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. &
S.A.,' 6 ' the Ninth Circuit articulated the principles underlying the
155. See Weller, supra note 28, at 615-19.
156. See id. at 617.
157. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 87 (E.D.N.C. 1965) (noting
that "Section 2(b) was written into the [McCarran-Ferguson] Act as an enunciation of the
Parker v. Brown decision"), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966); see also Weller, supra
note 28, at 617 n. 147 (stating that the state action doctrine and the McCarran-Ferguson
Act are intimately related).
158. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 487 (N.D. Cal. 1989);
see also In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 932 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that
although the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 ("FTAIA") does not
eliminate the defense of international comity, "it is only in an unusual case that comity
will require abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction").
159. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597,
608-09 (9th Cir. 1976).
160. Id. at 609; see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[W]hen possible, the decisions of foreign tribunals should
be given effect in domestic courts, since recognition fosters international cooperation
and encourages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stability.").
161. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
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doctrine of international comity:
[T]he antitrust laws require in the first instance that there be
some effect-actual or intended-on American foreign
commerce before the federal courts may legitimately exercise
subject matter jurisdiction under [the federal antitrust] statutes.
Second, a greater showing of burden or restraint may be
necessary to demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently large to
present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil
violation of the antitrust laws. Third, there is the additional
question which is unique to the international setting of whether
the interests of, and links to, the United States-including the
magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce-are
sufficiently strong, vis-A-vis those of other nations, to justify an
assertion of extraterritorial authority.' 62
The Timberlane court then adopted a "jurisdictional rule of reason"
and weighed several factors to determine whether, as a matter of international comity and fairness, it should exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. 63 Those factors include:
[T]he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal
places of business of corporations, the extent to which
enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve
compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United
States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce,
the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to
the violations charged of conduct
64 within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad.1
Although the oft quoted Timberlane test "has commanded a strong
162. Id. at 613 (footnote omitted). The Timberlane court based its analysis on the act
of state doctrine discussed in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897), which
held that "[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory." See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 605.
The Timberlane court also considered the act of state doctrine as stated in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 440 (1964) (noting that where American
courts face the question of whether to exercise jurisdiction over acts in a foreign jurisdiction, there is a potential for interference with the conduct of foreign affairs by other
branches of the government, and the jurisdictional decision must be based upon "the
balance of considerations"); and American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347, 357 (1909) (stating that "Itihe foregoing considerations would lead in case of
doubt to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and
effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate
power"). See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 605-06.
163. Id. at 613.
164. Id. at 614.
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following,"' 165 federal courts have not applied it consistently, 166 and as
the Supreme Court's five-to-four split in Hartford Fire Insurance
suggests, it remains a complex issue in the realm of insurance regulation in this country.
III. STEMMING THE TIDE OF FEDERAL AUTHORITY:
HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE CO. V. CALIFORNIA

The half-century of experience with the McCarran-Ferguson Act and
the related state action and comity doctrines culminated in 1993, in
what was broadly anticipated to be one of the most important cases
involving insurance regulation ever to be filed. The case promised (or
threatened) to resolve many of the past questions that had clouded
antitrust enforcement against insurance companies. While the case
promised some long-needed answers, the promises remained largely
unfulfilled. The answers provided by the Supreme Court were murky
and complex, involving two majority opinions on two different issues.
In many ways, the decision exemplifies the confused state of the law
that has arisen under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and thus illustrates
the need for a fresh start.
A. The Facts and ProceduralHistory of the Hartford
Fire Insurance Litigation
The Hartford FireInsurance litigation began with a series of actions
brought by nineteen states, as parens patriae actions, and numerous
private plaintiffs against a group of insurance companies, reinsurance
165. 1JAMES R. ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD § 6.11, at 162 (2d ed. 1981), quoted in Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at
932. The Third Circuit, for example, elaborated on the Timberlane opinion in formulating a ten-part test that considers: (I) the extent of any conflict with foreign law or
policy; (2) the nationality of both parties; (3) the relative importance of the alleged
violation in the United States compared to that abroad; (4) the availability of a remedy
or pending litigation abroad; (5) the existence of intent to harm or affect American
commerce and the foreseeability of that harm; (6) the impact upon foreign relations if
the court exercises its jurisdiction and grants relief; (7) whether a party will be forced to
perform an act that may be illegal in either country or will be subject to conflicting
requirements if the court grants relief; (8) whether the court can effectively enforce its
order; (9) whether the court's resolution of the controversy would be acceptable in this
country if made by a foreign nation under similar circumstances; and (10) whether any
treaty between the United States and the pertinent nations addresses the issue. See
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979);
see also ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra, at 162 & n.109 (discussing the Third Circuit's
application of the Timberlane factors in Manningron Mills).
166. See, e.g., infra part III.C.1, discussing the various approaches taken by the
district court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court in the Hartford Fire Insurance
litigation in applying the Timberlane test.
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companies, underwriters, brokers, individuals, and the Insurance
Services Office ("ISO"), alleging numerous violations of the federal
antitrust laws.'6 7 The litigation primarily focused on coverage under
commercial
general liability ("CGL") insurance and property insur68
ance. 1
In HartfordFire Insurance, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
primary insurers, reinsurers, retrocessional insurers, and ISO engaged
in several illegal conspiracies to restrict the terms of coverage of CGL
insurance in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 69 The events
that culminated in the alleged antitrust violations commenced in 1984,
when ISO filed two proposed new policy forms for CGL insurance
that substantially modified its previous policy forms. 7 ' One of the
proposed forms contained a traditional "occurrence-based" trigger,
167. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 468 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
168. Id. Typically, businesses, nonprofit organizations, and governmental entities
purchase CGL insurance as protection against liability claims of third parties for bodily
injury or property damage. These entities often purchase CGL coverage from primary
insurers such as the defendants Hartford Fire Insurance Co., Allstate Insurance Co., Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co., and the CIGNA Corp., which are some of the nation's major
providers of CGL insurance. Id. Primary insurers likewise share their risks with
reinsurers, and reinsurers in turn share their risks with retrocessional insurers, who
essentially provide insurance for reinsurers. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d
919, 922 (9th Cir. 1991). Reinsurance policies, commonly arranged by specialized
brokers and underwriters, are often written by syndicates doing business through Lloyd's
of London. Id. at 923. The arrangements between the primary insurer, the reinsurer, and
the retrocessional insurer can all affect the terms and availability of primary insurance.
Id. at 922. For example, the ability of a primary insurer to obtain reinsurance bears a
direct impact on the willingness and ability of the primary insurer to provide insurance
to businesses and other entities. See Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 473. In
the Hartford Fire Insurancecase, among the defendant reinsurers were both domestic and
foreign insurers, including one Swiss corporation and six London company market
corporations, all of which are subsidiaries of American corporations. Insurance
Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 922-23.
Commercial general liability policies are written predominately on standardized
policy forms developed by defendant ISO, an organization of 1400 property and casualty
insurers-including defendants Hartford, Allstate, Aetna, and CIGNA-that is licensed as
a rating service and advisory organization in all fifty states. Insurance Antitrust Litig.,
723 F. Supp. at 468. ISO prepares standardized policy forms and files them with state
insurance departments and also performs other services for primary insurers such as
providing loss data, projecting future loss trends, and calculating advisory rates. Id. at
468-69. Most importantly, however, ISO is the "almost exclusive source of support
services in this country for CGL insurance." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S.
Ct. 2891, 2896 (1993) (citation omitted).
169. Id. at 2895. Plaintiffs specifically claimed that the defendant insurers conspired
to affect several markets for insurance including the U.S. markets for CGL insurance,
excess and umbrella CGL insurance, property insurance, the reinsurance markets in both
the U.S. and the U.K, and the retrocessional insurance market in the U.K. Insurance
Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 924.
170. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2897.
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under which an insured would be covered for any claims arising out of
occurrences during the policy period, regardless of when the claim
was asserted. 7 ' Under an occurrence-based form, insurers risk exposure to so-called "long-tail" risks that could arise long after the policy
period ends. 72 The other proposed form included a "claims-made"
trigger under which coverage would be limited to claims actually made
during the policy period. 173 The claims-made form, however, did not
contain a retroactive-date provision. 74 Consequently, even under the
claims-made form, insurers would remain potentially liable for
unknown claims that could arise under previous policy provisions.'75
Both of the proposed forms provided coverage for "sudden and accidental pollution"
damage as well as unlimited coverage of legal defense
76
Costs. 1

Several of the defendant insurers objected to the proposed CGL
forms, particularly the retention of the occurrence-based form, the lack
of a retroactive-date provision on the claims-made form, and the
inclusion in both forms of the environmental and legal costs provisions. 177 Majorities in ISO subcommittees, however, supported the
proposed 1984 forms without any of the modifications desired by the
defendant insurers, and in December 1983, the ISO Board of Directors
approved the proposed forms and filed the forms with state regulators
in March of 1984.178
Dissatisfied with the adoption of the proposed CGL forms by ISO,
the defendant primary insurers, reinsurers, and retrocessional insurers
allegedly conspired to manipulate the standard CGL policies and to
compel other primary insurers to similarly modify their standard CGL
forms to conform with the particular policies that the defendant
insurers wished to sell. 179 Although the plaintiffs claim that the defen171. Id.
172. See Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 923.
173. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2896, 2897.
174. Id. at 2897. A "retroactive-date provision" restricts coverage even further than
a claims-made policy, by obligating the insurer to cover only those claims that are
based upon incidents that occur after a certain date specified in the policy. Id. at 2896.
Describing the benefit of a retroactive-date provision in a claims-made policy, the
Supreme Court noted that "(sluch a provision eliminates the risk that an issuer, by issuing a claims-made policy, would assume liability arising from incidents that occurred
before the policy's effective date, but remained undiscovered or caused no immediate
harm." Id.
175. See id.
176. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. CL at 2897.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2897-99.
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dant insurers engaged in several conspiracies in numerous combinations, the alleged conspirators essentially sought to secure four
changes in the proposed ISO forms: (1) the replacement of
occurrence-based coverage with claims-made coverage; (2) the
insertion of a retroactive-date provision, restricting coverage to claims
based on incidents that occurred after a certain date; (3) the elimination
of coverage for "sudden and accidental" pollution; and (4) the insertion
of a provision that would place a cap on legal defense costs."8
According to the complaints, the defendant primary insurers
engaged in a concerted effort to manipulate and restrict the terms of
ISO standard CGL forms. The defendants' alleged conspiracy began
in June 1984, when defendant Hartford allegedly persuaded major
reinsurers to agree to boycott the ISO form unless ISO added a
retroactive-date provision to its "claims-made" forms.' 8' Defendants
Hartford, Aetna, Allstate, and CIGNA also allegedly acted together to
successfully persuade key London underwriters at Lloyd's to agree to
boycott the ISO forms, using reinsurance brokers to convey their
message. 82 Indeed, lead underwriters at Lloyd's themselves allegedly
met representatives of ISO in London on July 4, 1984 and expressed
their desire to eliminate the occurrence form.'83 Four reinsurance
underwriters from Lloyd's then allegedly attended an ISO executive
committee meeting in September 1984, during which they insisted that
defendant Hartford's terms be included in the CGL form, effectively
84
telling ISO that it must "[c]hange the form or get no reinsurance."
According to the plaintiffs, ISO subsequently gave in to these
demands, eliminating accidental pollution coverage85and approving a
claims-made form with a retroactive-date provision.
The reinsurers allegedly continued to pressure ISO to eliminate the
180. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2897-99. Two important features of the
insurance industry may have helped to facilitate the defendant insurers' ability to exert
pressure on other primary insurers and to obtain their desired changes to the CGL forms.
First, most primary insurers rely on outside support services to provide the coverage
that they sell, and the defendant ISO is essentially the exclusive provider of such support
services in this country. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26 and note 168.
Second, most primary insurers must acquire insurance from reinsurers to cover a portion
of their risk. See supra note 168. Hence, by cooperation with or control over ISO and
major reinsurers, the defendant insurers could effectively compel other primary insurers
to conform their policies to the particular policies that the defendant insurers wanted to
sell.
181. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 923.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 929.
184. Id. at 923.
185. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 923. 1SO, however, continued to offer an
occurrence-based form. Id.
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occurrence-based form and also began to promote the new claimsmade forms by announcing publicly that they would not provide reinsurance for any primary insurers writing policies based on the
occurrence form.'86 Moreover, the plaintiffs claimed, the reinsurers

"refused to renew long-standing reinsurance treaties with primary
insurers in the United States unless they agreed to abandon the occurrence form."' 8 7

In late 1985, the defendant insurers also allegedly conspired to
restrain trade in the market for excess and umbrella insurance by
pressuring ISO to approve standard excess and umbrella CGL forms,
which are normally not offered on a regulated basis. 188 ISO
subsequently approved the proposed excess and umbrella policy
forms, which contained a retroactive-date provision in "claims-made"
policies and a pollution exclusion and cap
on defense costs in both
"claims-made" and "occurrence" policies. 89
Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that London retrocessional reinsurers
agreed in 1987 to boycott reinsurance and insurance policies for U.S.
property seepage and pollution exposures. 9 ° As evidence of the
alleged boycott, plaintiffs pointed to the "Non-Marine London Market
Agreement 1987," a document signed by over forty London retrocessional reinsurers that effectively denied U.S. customers primary
insurance coverage for seepage and pollution. 9'
Defendants filed five motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment, contending, inter alia, that they were entitled to
antitrust immunity under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 192 The district
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 924; see Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S.
Ct. at 2899.
189. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2899.
190. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 924.
19 1. Id. The signatories agreed that they would only write retrocessional reinsurance
policies if reinsurers signed a letter stating that:
We hereby agree that we will use our best endeavors to ensure that all U.S.A.
and Canadian exposed insurance/reinsurance business attaching on or after 1st
January 1987 will only be written where the original business includes a seepage and pollution exclusion clause wherever legal and applicable.
Id.
192. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 471. The other defenses that the
defendants raised included: (1) exemption under the state action immunity doctrine; (2)
lack of standing; (3) lack of any factual allegation linking the foreign reinsurer defendants to a global conspiracy; and (4) lack of subject matter jurisdiction and international
comity. Id. at 471-72. The foreign reinsurer and retrocessional reinsurer defendants and
one broker also moved to dismiss the two claims alleging conspiracies to eliminate
pollution coverage. Id. at 471.
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court granted the defendants motion, 9 3 but the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed. 94 The Supreme Court granted the defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari on three issues, including
"[wihether agreements among primary insurers and reinsurers on such
matters as standardized advisory insurance policy forms and terms of
insurance coverage constitute a 'boycott' outside the exemption of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act." 95
B. Application of the McCarran-FergusonAct to the
Hartford Fire Insurance Case
All three courts in HartfordFire Insurance agreed that determining
whether McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity applies to certain conduct
involves a three-step analysis. First, the court must examine whether
the pertinent conduct is within the scope of the "business of insurance."' 96 The court then must determine whether that business is
regulated by the states. 97 Finally, the court must determine whether
the conduct at issue involves "boycott, coercion or intimidation."'' 98
1. The "Business of Insurance"
In InsuranceAntitrust Litigation (as HartfordFire Insurance was
captioned in the lower courts), the plaintiffs took the position that the
McCarran-Ferguson antitrust exemption for the insurance industry did
not extend to the reinsurers or retrocessional insurers because, under
the reasoning of Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno,'99 the
193. See Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 925. The court of appeals characterized the district court's action as a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action or, in
the alternative, as summary judgment for the defendants. Id.
194. Id. at 934.
195. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2900 n.8 (citation omitted). The Court
granted certiorari to consider two other questions: "I. Whether domestic insurance
companies whose conduct otherwise would be exempt from the federal antitrust laws
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act lose that exemption because they participate with
foreign reinsurers in the business of insurance"; and "2. Whether agreements among
primary insurers and reinsurers on such matters as standardized advisory insurance policy
forms and terms of insurance coverage constitute a 'boycott' outside of the McCarranFerguson Act." Id.
196. See Hartford Fire Insurance v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2901 (1993);
Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 927; Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at
473.
197. See Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2902; Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938
F.2d at 931; Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 473.
198. See Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2901; Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938
F.2d at 928; Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 473.
199. 458 U.S. 119 (1982). In Pireno, the Supreme Court established specific criteria
for determining what constitutes the "business of insurance." See supra notes 85-86 and
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"business of insurance" does not include reinsurance. 200 In support of
this argument, the plaintiffs contended that reinsurance only indirectly
relates to risk-spreading and that it is not integral to the policy
relationship between the insurer and insured. 20 ' The district court
disagreed with the plaintiffs, and it held that at all levels, the activities
of the defendants involved the "business of insurance," including
primary, excess or umbrella insurance, reinsurance, and retrocessional
insurance. 20 2 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' argument was an
unreasonably narrow application of the language in Pireno and that
reinsurance was indeed "an integral and vital part of the business of
insurance. 2 3 The court noted that its conclusion was consistent with
the plaintiffs' characterization of reinsurance as a vital component of
the insurance industry in their complaints. 2°4
Although, in the words of the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiffs did not
"seriously argue" on appeal that the foreign reinsurance contracts did
not constitute the "business of insurance," this issue found its way into
the Supreme Court's opinion in another context. In the Ninth Circuit,
the plaintiffs argued that even though reinsurance and retrocessional
insurance activities constituted the "business of insurance" and were
normally exempt from federal antitrust laws, the defendant insurers
had forfeited their McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption. 20 5 The Ninth
Circuit agreed, concluding that under the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co. ,26 the
domestic defendants lost their McCarran-Ferguson immunity when
they conspired with the nonexempt foreign defendants. 2°7
The Supreme Court did not address whether the foreign reinsurers
were subject to state regulation.20 8 Instead, in the only unanimous part
accompanying text.
200. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 473. It was undisputed that the
defendant insurers' activities pertaining to the terms and conditions of primary, excess,
and umbrella coverage involved the "business of insurance." Id.
201. Id.
202. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 473-74.
203. Id. at 473.
204. Id. The court also noted that the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act referred to reinsurance. Id. (citing 90 Cong. Rec. A4406 (1944) and 89 Cong. Rec.
6528 (1943)).
205. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 928.
206. 440 U.S. 205 (1979). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's Royal Drug decision, see supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
207. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 928 (citing Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at
231).
208. For the Ninth Circuit's discussion of this issue, see Insurance Antitrust Litig.,
938 F.2d at 928.
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of its decision, the Court stated that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
of Royal Drug was in error.2°9 Writing for the Court, Justice Souter

reasoned that the court of appeals' reliance upon Royal Drug was
based on a faulty analogy and concluded that the court of appeals was
incorrect in holding that the defendant domestic insurers had forfeited
their McCarran-Ferguson exemption "simply because they agreedor
acted with
foreign reinsurers that ...
2 10
Law. "

,

were 'not regulated by State

One particular passage in the Court's opinion in Royal Drug
supplied the source of controversy between the Supreme Court and the
court of appeals in the HartfordFire Insurance case:
Application of [the principle that antitrust exemptions are to be
narrowly construed] is particularly appropriate in this case
because the Pharmacy Agreements involve parties wholly
outside the insurance industry. In analogous contexts, the
Court has held that an exempt entity forfeits antitrust exemption
by acting in concert with nonexempt parties. The Court has
held, for example, that an exempt agricultural cooperative under
the Capper-Volstead2 t Act loses its exemption if it conspires with
nonexempt parties.

In the Hartford Fire Insurance case, the court of appeals grasped
onto the language quoted above as precedent for its decision that as a
rule, an exempt party forfeits its exemption by conspiring with a
nonexempt party. 2 2 The Supreme Court, however, characterized the
Royal Drug passage as a "rough analogy" because the examples cited
there concerned the Capper-Volstead Act, which exempts entities
rather than activities.23 In contrast, the Court suggested, the
209. See Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2903.
2 10. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2903 (quoting Insurance Antitrust Litig.,
938 F.2d at 928) (footnote omitted). The Court refused to express an opinion as to
whether state law regulated the activities of either the domestic or foreign reinsurers,
leaving that question to the court of appeals on remand. Id. at 2903 n. 12.
211. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 231 (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations
omitted). Applying this principle to the Blue Shield Pharmacy Agreements, the Court
further commented on the narrowness of the exemption:
If agreements between an insurer and retail pharmacists are the "business of
insurance" because they reduce the insurer's costs, then so are all other agreements insurers may make to keep their costs under control-whether with
automobile body repair shops or landlords. Such agreements would be exempt
from the antitrust laws if Congress had extended the coverage of the McCarranFerguson Act to the "business of insurance companies." But that is precisely
what Congress did not do.
Id. at 232-33 (footnote omitted).
212. See Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 928.
213. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2902.
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McCarran-Ferguson Act only exempts activities inherent in the business of insurance, and not the mere status of being an insurer.214
Within this context, the Supreme Court concluded that the agreements in HartfordFire Insurance differed from the agreements in
Royal Drug. 21 The Court noted that agreements made by insurance
companies with entities outside the insurance industry, such as Blue
Shield's agreements with pharmacies, "are unlikely to be about
anything that could be called 'the business of insurance. ' ' 216 The
Court opined that such transactions may constitute the "business of
insurance companies," but they do not involve the "business of insurance" within the meaning of the Act. 217 Applying these principles to
the facts of Hartford Fire Insurance, the Court noted that the
defendants allegedly conspired with participants in the insurance
industry, and concluded that their agreements did involve the
"business of insurance." 21 8 Thus, because the McCarran-Ferguson
Act exempts activities, not particular entities, the Court held that the
defendant insurers did not lose their antitrust immunity by acting in
concert with nonexempt entities; rather, the defendant insurers qualified for the antitrust exemption under the Act because their alleged
activities were within the scope of the "business of insurance."
2. Division of Authority Between the States
and the Federal Government
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the federal antitrust laws can
only apply to the business of insurance "to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State Law., 219 Although the plaintiffs
argued that the defendants' business activities were not regulated by
state law and thus not exempted from the federal antitrust laws under
McCarran-Ferguson, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaints that the
defendants had violated state laws in addition to federal antitrust
laws. 220 Noting the rather substantial regulatory schemes of each of
214. The Court's opinions in Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2891, Royal
Drug, 440 U.S. at 205, National Securities, 393 U.S. at 453, and SEC v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959), present a line of cases that suggest that a
defendant's activities are more important than the type of entity the defendant is in
determining whether it is exempt from the antitrust laws under the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.
215. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2902.
216. Id. (quoting Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 233).
217. Id.
218. Id. The Court further noted that it was undisputed that the alleged conspiracies
fell within the scope of the "business of insurance." Id.
219. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988); see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
220. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 474.
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the nineteen plaintiff states (including Florida and Illinois, the states of
residence of two individual plaintiffs), the district court concluded that
insurance companies subject to these regulations qualified for the
federal antitrust exemption under McCarran-Ferguson.22'
The court of appeals found the district court's analysis unconvincing
and stated that the pleading of one count (under state law) does not
necessarily destroy the foundation of an alternative count (under
federal law).222 In other words, the plaintiffs were not "trapped by
[their] pleadings. 223 The court of appeals also noted that whereas the
domestic defendants had pleaded that their business was subject to
state regulation, the foreign defendants had argued that they were not
subject to any regulation under the doctrine of comity. 224 Thus, by
extending McCarran-Ferguson antitrust immunity to the defendants,
the district court allowed the defendants, though not the plaintiffs, to
rely upon alternative theories. 225 The court of appeals reasoned that
since the defendants were not penalized for proceeding under alternative theories, neither should the plaintiffs be penalized, stating "[wihat
is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. '226 Therefore, under the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning, McCarran-Ferguson does not force
plaintiffs to choose either a state or federal remedy at the pleading
stage. Rather, McCarran-Ferguson allows plaintiffs to pursue federal
antitrust as well as state remedies. 2 '
3. The "Boycott" Exclusion
Even though a particular activity involves the "business of insurance" and is regulated by state law, it is not immunized from federal
antitrust laws if it involves a "boycott, coercion or intimidation. 228
221. Id.
222. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 928.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 927-28. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of the international comity issue in Hartford Fire Insurance, see infra part III.C.1.
225. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 928.
226. Id. More fundamentally, the court of appeals reasoned that state insurance laws
could not regulate foreign defendants because states do not have the power to regulate
beyond their borders. Id. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, McCarran-Ferguson Act
immunity would not attach to foreign defendants. Id. As a result, the court of appeals
held that the exempt defendant insurers had forfeited their immunity by conspiring with
the nonexempt defendant insurers. Id. (citing Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 231; Beltz Travel
Serv., Inc. v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 620 F.2d 1360, 1366-67 (9th Cir.
1980)). The Supreme Court, however, reversed this holding and the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of Royal Drug. See supra notes 208-18 and accompanying text.
227. See Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 928.
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1988).
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The greatest difference between the opinions of the district court and
the court of appeals in Insurance Antitrust Litigation involved the
"boycott" issue, which also sparked heated debate among the Supreme
Court Justices.
Both the lower courts in Hartford Fire Insurance relied upon St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry,229 the seminal and only
case prior to Hartford Fire Insurance to define the term "boycott"
within the context of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. On the basis of
relatively fine distinctions and a narrow reading of certain passages in
Barry, the district court determined that no boycott existed within the
meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 23° After an examination of
essentially the same passages, however, the court of appeals arrived at
the opposite conclusion. 23 The Supreme Court, in contrast, interpreted the term "boycott" to mean something quite different from either
of the lower courts' definitions.
The district court in Hartford Fire Insurance read the Supreme
Court's opinion in Barry quite narrowly. Based upon its conclusion
that Barry required an absolute refusal to deal with policyholders, the
district court reasoned that the outcome in Barry "turned not on the
pressure and compulsion directed at policy holders to submit to
curtailed coverage, but on the agreement with competitors not to deal
with those policy holders on any terms. 232 In addition to the Supreme
Court's Barry decision, the district court also relied on a line of cases
and commentary which argued that a boycott must involve concerted
denials of market access to consumers, rather than mere pressure on
other insurers to provide reduced coverage. 233 The district court
eventually concluded:
What the McCarran Act leaves unprotected is conduct which
goes beyond the making and implementation of agreements to
229. 438 U.S. 531 (1978). For a discussion of Barry, see supra notes 54-70 and
accompanying text.
230. See Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 475-79.
231. See Insurance Antitrust Litig., 928 F.2d at 928-30.
232. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 476.
233. Id. at 476-78 (citing Feinstein v. Nettleship Co., 714 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984); Proctor v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d
262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), vacated, 440 U.S. 942 (1979); Meicler v. Aetna Casualty and Sur.
Co., 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Workers' Compensation Ins. Antitrust Litig.,
867 F.2d 1552 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818
(1989); UNR Indus., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 607 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. I1. 1984);
Grant v. Erie Ins. Exch., 542 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 716 F.2d 890 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983)). The court also quoted PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
210.2, at 107-08 (Supp. 1988). See Insurance
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 477.
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do business only on terms acceptable to the participant (even if
such agreements would otherwise violate Section 1), such as
refusals to deal on any terms and exclusion from alternative
sources. Such conduct is not charged here. 234

The court of appeals strongly disagreed with the district court's
interpretation and characterization of Barry and concluded that the
defendants' alleged conduct in Hartford Fire Insurance was indeed a
boycott within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.235
According to the court of appeals, the district court had placed undue
emphasis upon statements in Barry which suggested that a boycott
involves a total refusal to deal with policyholders.236 In contrast, the
court of appeals relied upon portions of Barry which indicated that the
mere "enlistment of third parties in an agreement not to trade, as a
means of compelling capitulation by the boycotted group, long has
been viewed as conduct supporting a finding of unlawful boycott. 237
The court of appeals then noted that defendant Hartford and the other
defendant primary insurers had allegedly engaged in such actions by
enlisting reinsurers to compel ISO and some of the more reluctant
primary insurers to alter their policies. 238 The London reinsurers
likewise engaged in such actions, the court noted, by2 denying
retro39
cessional coverage on policies covering pollution risks.
The court of appeals then attempted to articulate a general rule for
234. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 478 (citations omitted). As the
district court explained its reasoning:
The purpose of McCarran Act immunity is to permit joint action by insurers
and underwriters within the states' regulatory schemes to formulate policy
terms and determine coverage. While it is not a necessary part of the policy
development process that the participants would then offer substantially
similar policies to the public, it is a consequence that could be reasonably
anticipated. To subject the participants in the collective form development
process to the risk of antitrust liability for using the product of that process
would effectually nullify the McCarran Act. It makes no sense, therefore, for
the plaintiffs to rest their boycott claim on the allegation of such an agreement. It is also implicit that joint action comprehends efforts to seek agreement by others, including those who might be unwilling to agree were it not
for economic exigencies, and again it makes no sense to assert that such
efforts constitute non-immune coercion.
Id. (citations omitted).
235. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 930.
236. Id. The court of appeals specifically stated that "[tihe district court ... placed
an emphasis that we do not on the [Barry] Court's statement that the boycotting insurers
there would not deal with the doctors 'on any terms.' The district court supplied italics
for this phrase, which is unemphasized in the [Barry] Court's opinion." Id.
237. Id. at 929 (quoting Barry, 438 U.S. at 544-45).
238. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 929.
239. Id.
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boycotts under the Act, stating that a boycott occurs where an activity
involves "the use of the economic power of a third party to force the
boycott victim to agree to the boycott beneficiary's terms. ' 24 Under
this standard, the court of appeals concluded that the Hartford Fire
Insurance plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to indicate that the
defendant insurers had engaged in a boycott, for the defendant reinsurers and London underwriters had allegedly used their economic
power-their refusal to reinsure-to compel ISO and the other primary
insurers to accept the policy terms that the defendant insurers wanted
to sell.24'
In the most controversial section of the Supreme Court's Hartford
Fire Insurance decision, the Court held by a five-to-four vote that the
term "boycott" had acquired a very specific and limited meaning under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.242 Justice Scalia, who delivered the
opinion of the Court on this issue, began his analysis of the scope of
the term "boycott" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act by tracing the
origin of the word "boycott" to the story of Captain Boycott and the
Irish Land League.243 Upon examination of the history of Captain
Boycott's misfortunes and several dictionary definitions of the term
"boycott," 2 " Justice Scalia concluded that there is a clear distinction
240. Id. at 930 (citations omitted). in reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals
noted that the Barry Court had held that the term "boycott" included boycotts directed
against both policyholders and competitors alike, and thus the Court's definition did not
exclude from the definition of "boycott" refusals to deal except on the terms demanded.
Id.
241. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 929-30.
242. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2911.
243. Id. As Justice Scalia noted, the term "boycott" was first used in the late 19th
century "to describe the collective action taken against Captain Charles Boycott, an
English agent managing various estates in Ireland." Id. Because Captain Boycott had
refused to reduce rents, the entire population of the region collectively resolved not to
have any relations with him until he capitulated. Id.
244. Justice Scalia examined several dictionary definitions of the term "boycott."
One dictionary defined "boycott" as "'[t]o combine in refusing to hold relations of any
kind, social or commercial, public or private, with (a neighbour), on account of political
or other differences, so as to punish him for the position he has taken up, or coerce him
into abandoning it."' Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2911 (quoting 2 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 468 (2d ed. 1989)). Justice Scalia also considered another dictionary definition of the term, defining a "boycott" somewhat differently as "'to withhold,
wholly or in part, social or business intercourse from, as an expression of disapproval
or means of coercion."' Id. at 2912 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(2d ed. 1950)).
Black's Law Dictionary, which was not cited by Justice Scalia, provides a third
alternative. It defines a "boycott" as "[a] conspiracy or confederation to prevent the
carrying on of business, or to injure the business of any one by preventing potential
customers from doing business with him or employing the representatives of said
business, by threats, intimidation, coercion, etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 187 (6th
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between a true "boycott" and a "concerted agreement to terms. 245
Whereas a boycott involves a refusal to deal on one transaction in
order to obtain concessions on another, unrelated transaction,246
Justice Scalia observed, a "concerted agreement to seek terms"
involves a refusal to deal on one transaction-to obtain concessions in
the same transaction.247 Justice Scalia noted that leading cases in the
fields of antitrust 248 and labor law249 also support the distinction
between "boycotts" and "concerted agreements seeking terms."
Although he noted that the term "boycott" only appears in seven
nonlabor antitrust cases prior to the enactment of the McCarranFerguson Act, 25 0 Justice Scalia only briefly discussed the Court's
Barry decision, which is arguably the only prior decision on point. In
his only paragraph addressing the case, he asserted that the finding of
a boycott in Barry was not surprising because "[tihe insisted-upon
condition of the boycott... bore no relationship... to the proposed
contracts of insurance that the physicians wished to conclude with St.
Paul's competitors. 25 ' Justice Scalia did not, however, address the
rest of the Barry decision, including the Barry Court's analysis of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act's legislative history, which appeared to read
the term "boycott" quite broadly.
Under Justice Scalia's definition of the term "boycott," some of the
plaintiff's allegations in Hartford Fire Insurance survived the
defendant insurers' motion to dismiss. Construing the issues of fact in
ed. 1990).
245. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2912.
246. Justice Scalia observed that it is the "expansion of the refusal to deal beyond the
targeted transaction," in which unrelated transactions are used as leverage to achieve
desired terms, "that gives great coercive force to a commercial boycott .
I..."
Id.
247. Id. In a forceful dissent, Justice Souter claimed that the solicitation of a refusal
to deal, even in the primary transaction, constituted a "boycott." Id. at 2905 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); see infra text accompanying notes 255-64 for a more thorough discussion
of Justice Souter's dissent on the boycott issue.
248. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2912-13 (citing United States v. First
Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930); Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n of Pacific Coast, 272 U.S.
359 (1926); and Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S.
600 (1914)). As Justice Scalia conceded, "concerted agreements seeking terms" are as
unlawful as boycotts in the antitrust arena, so no distinction is necessary under the
antitrust cases. Id. at 2913. Indeed, difficulties in defining "boycott" arise because the
term is not used in any antitrust statute other than the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
249. Id. at 2913-14 (citing In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895)). Under Justice Scalia's
analysis, a strike seeking better contractual terms in an employment contract does not
constitute a boycott; the strike only becomes a boycott if the strikers seek to obtain
some advantage from the employer unrelated to the employment contract. Id.
250. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2913 n.4.
251. Id. at 2914.
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a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Court held that the complaints sufficiently alleged facts demonstrating that the defendant
insurers had engaged in one or more boycotts. For example, as
Justice Scalia noted, the complaints alleged that "primary insurers who
wrote insurance on disfavored forms would be refused all reinsurance,
'
even as to risks written on otherforms."252
Justice Scalia observed
that these actions might indeed constitute a boycott "unless the primary
insurers' other business were relevant to the proposed reinsurance
contract. 253 Similarly, the complaints alleged that reinsurers threatened to boycott all North American CGL risks, not just CGL policies
containing dissatisfactory terms.254
Dissenting on the boycott issue, Justice Souter criticized the majority for employing an "overly narrow" definition of the term
"boycott." 5 Although he found common ground with the majority on
several points, 25 6 Justice Souter argued that the South-Eastern
Underwriters Court was the first court to use the terms "boycott,"
"coercion," and "intimidation" in the insurance antitrust context, and
noted that the Court had provided a list of prohibited activities. 7
Considering this and the Barry Court's guidance, Justice Souter concluded that the term "boycott" does not refer to a "unitary phenomenon." 258 According to Justice Souter, the crucial issue was
whether the defendant insurers' actions constituted "enforcement
activities" that would raise the alleged activity to the level of a section
3(b) boycott.259 Justice Souter noted that the defendant primary insurers allegedly "solicited refusals to deal from outside the primary insurance industry as a means of forcing their fellow primary insurers to
agree to their terms; the outsiders, acting at the behest of the four, in
fact refused to deal with primary insurers until they capitulated. 26 °
252. Id. at 2916.
253. Id.
254. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2916.
255. Id. at 2903 (Souter, J., dissenting).
256. Justice Souter and the majority agreed on the following points: (1) only
refusals to deal involving the coordinated action of multiple actors constitutes a
boycott; (2) a boycott need not involve an absolute refusal to deal; (3) a boycott need
not involve unequal treatment of the boycott's targets and its instigators; and (4)
concerted activity, while necessary, is not alone a sufficient condition to find a boycott.
Id. at 2903-04 (Souter, J.,dissenting).
257. Id. at 2904-05 (Souter, J.,dissenting) (citing United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 535-36 (1944)).
258. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2905 (Souter, J.,dissenting) (quoting
Barry, 438 U.S. at 543 (citation omitted)).
259. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
260. Id. (Souter, J.,dissenting).
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This pattern of activity, Justice Souter concluded, bore a "striking
resemblance" to the activity in South-Eastern Underwritersand fell
"squarely within even the narrow theory of the § 3(b) exception Justice
261
Stewart advanced in dissent in Barry.,
Justice Souter further criticized the majority for ignoring several
"crucial features" of the enforcement activities that bound the defendant
insurers into a single course of action "recognizable as a § 3(b)
boycott., 26 2 For instance, Justice Souter opined that if the reinsurers
had indeed acted "at the behest" of the primary insurers, they could not
have been acting entirely in their own independent self-interest.263
Justice Souter therefore concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations
demonstrated that the primary insurers must have wanted to ensure that
no other primary insurers would be able to sell policies that the four
defendants did not want to sell.26
Justice Souter and the majority seem to have disagreed on the nature
of the relationship between the primary insurers and the reinsurers, a
distinction that is important to both opinions. Justice Souter argued
that reinsurance constitutes a separate, specialized product, "'[tihe
availability [of which] affects the ability and willingness of primary
insurers to provide insurance to their customers.' '' 265 Consequently,
Justice Souter did not view the difference between the primary insurance and reinsurance industries as a mere "technical" distinction.266
The majority, on the other hand, concluded that there was an "integral
relationship" between primary insurers and reinsurers and noted that
"the terms of the primary coverages are central
elements of the
' 267
reinsurance contract-they are what is reinsured.
Justice Souter ended his dissent with what may be characterized as a
"slippery slope" argument. According to Justice Souter, the majority
would conclude that the defendant reinsurers would not be engaged in
a boycott if the primary insurers' other business bore some relation to
the proposed policies-for instance, if the reinsurer assumes added

261. Id. at 2905-06 (Souter, J., dissenting). As characterized by Justice Souter,
Justice Stewart's dissent advocated limiting the term "boycott" to "'attempts by
members of the insurance business to force other members to follow the industry's
private rules and practices."' Id. at 2906 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Barry, 438
U.S. at 565 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
262. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2907 (Souter, J., dissenting).
263. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
264. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
265. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Complaint of the State of California, 1 34).
266. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
267. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2907, 2914.

1994]

Insurance Regulation After Hartford Fire Insurance

347

2 68
risk where the primary insurer engages in riskier transactions.
Under the majority's standard, Justice Souter argued, reinsurers that
refuse to deal with a primary insurer would not be engaged in a
boycott if they could merely show that "(1) insuring the risk in
question increases the probability that the primary insurer will become
insolvent, and that (2) it costs more to administer the reinsurance
contracts of a bankrupt primary insurer (including those unrelated to
the risk that caused the primary insurer to declare bankruptcy). 269
Justice Souter concluded by warning that in similar situations decided
under the majority's standard, there would be an erosion of "what
remains of the § 3(b) exception.' 27 °

C. The Defenses of International Comity and State Action
In the HartfordFire Insurance litigation, the defendants claimed that
two other doctrines should bar the application of the federal antitrust
laws. The foreign defendants raised the principle of international
comity, and all defendants raised the state action defense.
1. The Principle of International Comity
As a defense against the application of the federal antitrust laws, the
foreign reinsurer defendants in Hartford FireInsurancecontended that
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
brought against them, based on either the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1982271 ("FTAIA") or the doctrine of international comity as articulated
in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
2 72
S.A.
&
N.T.
America,
Under the FTAIA, the Sherman Act does not apply "to conduct
involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import
commerce) with foreign nations" unless that conduct "has a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on commerce within the
United States, import trade into the United States, or export trade
engaged in by a person within the United States.273 The HartfordFire
Insurance plaintiffs argued that the foreign defendants' conduct
268. Id. at 2908 (Souter, J., dissenting).
269. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
270. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
271. Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246 (1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988)).
The law added a new section to the Sherman Act.
272. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). For a thorough discussion of the principles
behind the doctrine of international comity and the way in which the courts have applied
the doctrine, see supra part ll.F.2.
273. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988).
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satisfied the FTAIA's import trade exception, alleging that the London
reinsurers had conspired to restrict the terms on which reinsurance
policies could be written and to refuse to reinsure "long-tail" risks or
risks written on occurrence forms.2 74 Such coercion and intimidation
of primary insurers and individuals who might communicate with
regulatory bodies, the plaintiffs alleged, resulted in the unavailability
of occurrence liability coverage for many risks.27 5 The foreign defendants responded that the FTAIA should bar the application of the
Sherman Act to their activities because the alleged conduct pertaining
to reinsurance transactions involved "wholly foreign commerce.' 27 6
The district court, however, concluded that the FTAIA did not
preclude Sherman Act jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had
"adequately alleged that a decision not to provide reinsurance or retrocessional reinsurance to cover certain types of risks in the United
States has a direct effect on the availability of primary insurance in the
United States. 2 77 The defendants did not brief the issue on
appeal,
27 8
and the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision.
The foreign defendant insurers also raised international comity as a
defense to the application of the federal antitrust laws. In Hartford
Fire Insurance, both the district court and the court of appeals applied
several of the Timberlane factors, but reached opposite conclusions in
almost every instance. The district court held that international comity
required abstention from exercising jurisdiction over the foreign
defendants, 279 but the court of appeals held that international comity
did not preclude the exercise of Sherman Act jurisdiction. 2 0 The
Supreme Court performed a slightly different analysis of the international comity issue than had the lower courts. 8 ' Justice Souter,
274. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 484.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 486. The district court noted that a large portion of the of transactions
involved in the purchase of reinsurance occur in London. Id. at 485. The court also
noted, however, that the sequence of transactions actually commences in the United
States when a consumer purchases insurance from a primary insurer who then decides to
purchase reinsurance from the reinsurers in London. Id. More importantly, the court
observed that the alleged refusal to sell reinsurance to certain U.S. primary insurers
would produce substantial effects in the U.S., thereby precluding any characterization of
the alleged activity as "wholly foreign commerce."
Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F.
Supp. at 486.
277. Id. (citation omitted).
278. See Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 932.
279. See Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 487-90.
280. See Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 932-34.
281. The lower courts first determined whether FTAIA granted the district court
Sherman Act jurisdiction and then examined whether international comity precluded
exercising that jurisdiction. The extent to which the Supreme Court analyzed the juris-
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writing for the five-to-four majority, first commented that the Sherman
Act does indeed apply to "foreign conduct that was meant to produce
22
and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.
Justice Souter then asserted that the determining factor and only
"substantial question" in the HartfordFire Insurance case was whether
American law truly conflicted with the relevant British law.283 In
arguing that American and British law did in fact conflict, the foreign
reinsurers claimed that Parliament had established a comprehensive
regulatory scheme for the London reinsurance market and that the
London reinsurers' conduct was consistent with that scheme.284
Justice Souter responded, however, that the existence of such a regulatory scheme in Great Britain did not demonstrate a conflict, and that
the London reinsurers' compliance with the British regulations merely
indicated that the conduct was lawful in Great Britain." 5 Thus, the
Court concluded that "[s]ince the London reinsurers do not argue that
British law requires them to act in some fashion prohibited by the law
of the United States, or claim that their compliance with the laws of
both countries is otherwise impossible, we see no conflict with British
law. 286
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that it was "unimaginable" that
the assertion of legislative jurisdiction would be considered reasonable, and found it "inappropriate to assume" that Congress intended
American courts to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in these
circumstances.287 Claiming his argument was substantive, not
jurisdictional, Justice Scalia proceeded from the premise that even if
dictional issue under FTAIA or notions of international comity is not entirely clear. The
Court specifically found that Congress, in enacting FTAIA in 1982, failed to state
"whether a court with Sherman Act jurisdiction should ever decline jurisdiction on the
grounds of international comity." Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2910. The
Court noted that even assuming that a court may decline to exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction, international comity would not have precluded the exercise of such jurisdiction
in this case. Id. Such a statement arguably implies that an international comity analysis was not required. The Court, however, subsequently considered whether a conflict
existed between the relevant domestic and foreign law, a consideration of international
comity in itself. Id.; see also Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d
1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979) (considering the conflict between foreign and domestic
law in examining international comity).
282. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2909 (citations omitted).
283. Id. at 2910.
284. Id. The British Government, appearing as amicus curiae in the Hartford Fire
Insurance case, agreed that application of the FTAIA would conflict with the British law.
Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 2911.
287. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S. Ct. at 2921 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction exists, a nation should refrain from exercising jurisdiction
if that exercise is "unreasonable. 2 188 Justice Scalia observed that the
British government had established a comprehensive scheme regulating the London reinsurance market and that it had a strong interest in
doing so. 289 Moreover, Justice Scalia reasoned, because the
McCarran-Ferguson Act permits state law to displace the Sherman Act
of
except where the activity constitutes a "boycott," federal regulation 290
States.
United
the
to
importance
"slight"
only
of
was
the reinsurers
Accordingly, Justice Scalia concluded that "[r]arely would these
factors point more clearly against application of United States law. 29 '
2. The "State Action" Defense
Although the defendants contended that the state action doctrine
precluded the application of the federal antitrust laws to their activities,
neither the district court nor the court of appeals in the Hartford Fire
Insurance case had the benefit of the Supreme Court's guidance in
FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. 292 In response to the defendants'
state action argument, the plaintiffs contended that while the states may
have authorized voluntary joint action, they did not authorize coercion
or boycotts by private insurance companies. 293 The district court,
however, concluded that immunity under the state action doctrine
could also arise from a state's "authority to conduct collective policy
development activities." 94 Applying the two-prong inquiry set forth
in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia relied upon I RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1) (1987) for this
"reasonableness" standard. See Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2921 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia cited several factors to be considered in determining what
constitutes a reasonable exercise of jurisdiction: "'the extent to which the activity takes
place within the territory [of the regulating state]; the connections, such as nationality,
residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally
responsible for the activity to be regulated; the character of the activity to be regulated,
the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted; the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity;' and 'the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state."' See id.
dissenting) (quoting I RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
(Scalia, J.,
THE UNITED STATES § 403(2)(a)-(h) (1987)).
dissenting).
289. Hartford Fire Insurance, 113 S.Ct. at 2921 (Scalia, J.,
290. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
291. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
292. 112 S.Ct. 2169 (1992). For a discussion of the state action doctrine as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ticor and its effect on the application of the antitrust
laws to the insurance industry, see supra part II.F.I.
293. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 480.
294. Id.
288.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
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Inc.,295 the district court determined that each state had articulated
express policies permitting joint rate filings, thereby fulfilling the first
requirement of Midcal, and that the existence of state supervision in the
form of "approval, disapproval, or modification of the end product of
the collective action" satisfied Midcal's second requirement.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion,
stating that "nothing in the affidavit evidence submitted by the defendants shows that the relevant states supervised or approved the
boycotts used to produce agreement on the forms. ' 2 97 The court of
appeals distinguished the alleged anticompetitive activities from what
the states had actually regulated:
[S]tate approval of one activity is not state approval of a related
but distinct activity. The alleged anti-competitive conduct in the
present case . . .was neither a reasonable nor necessary consequence of the conduct regulated and approved by the state. The
agreements to refuse to reinsure were not state action.298
Thus, the court of appeals held that the state action doctrine did not
immunize the defendant insurers from antitrust liability. 299 The
Supreme Court did not address the state action doctrine, and thus the
opportunity for further clarification of the doctrine in the context of
insurance antitrust regulation was lost.
IV. REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE:
A PLEA FOR RATIONAL DISCOURSE
For several reasons, the Supreme Court's Hartford Fire Insurance
decision is certain to bring the issue of insurance regulation to a rolling
boil once again. First, the Hartford Fire Insurance opinion seems to
provide the first diminution of federal power over insurance since
1969. This diminution and limitation is small, of course, reflected
only in a reduction in scope of the term "boycott." Nevertheless, this
reduction is the first such action by the Supreme Court in over thirty
years. Perhaps more important than this slight change in the law is the
convoluted and confused nature of the decision itself. The operative
"boycott" portion of the decision consists only of a fragile five-to-four
majority. The Court's view on this matter is unlikely to change in the
295. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). For a discussion of Midcal, see supra notes 118-27 and
accompanying text.
296. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 480-81.
297. Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 931.
298. Id. (citations omitted).
299. Id.
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near future, barring any unexpected changes in the makeup or position
of the Court. It is also important to note that the Court did not rely on
any broader "states' rights" argument, nor on grounds of policy that
regulation of the insurance industry is better left to the states. The
Court's reliance on a narrow definition to resolve a case with such
massive policy implications reveals an unwillingness or an inability to
ascertain overriding policy objectives from the Act and its legislative
history.
Moreover, the Court's decision places many of the current problems
of insurance regulation on full display. The international law problems
in the Hartford Fire Insurance litigation only exacerbate the already
difficult question of regulation. It is extremely difficult for the federal
government to regulate the international aspects of the insurance industry under the antitrust laws. It is virtually impossible for the states to
do so. The split in the Supreme Court underlines the difficulties
inherent in regulating interstate firms at any level. Furthermore, the
case demonstrates that the state action doctrine is yet another
complicating factor in the regulation of the insurance industry. This
doctrine, modified through the Ticor case, provides another limitation
on the use of the antitrust laws to regulate the insurance industry.
Indeed, under the state action doctrine, states may be able to displace
the effectiveness of the antitrust laws in regulating insurance, even in
the absence of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
The Court's opinion, although demonstrating many of the problems
inherent in the current scheme of insurance regulation, at least provides
some solutions to improving the current scheme. The "activities"
standard of Hartford Fire Insurance, which looks to the particular
activity in which the insurance company engages rather than to the
entity itself to determine whether the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust
exemption applies, presents a fairly flexible and realistic standard that
can be adjusted to the realities of the insurance world. The adoption of
a broad standard that would exempt insurance companies from federal
antitrust regulation in all circumstances would be somewhat dangerous
and might also provide an incentive to businesses to inoculate
themselves from federal authority by engaging in various insurance
activities. As the insurance industry develops, new risks are created,
and insurance companies are frequently integrated into other financial
organizations. It is therefore important to have a rule that permits the
courts to apply the original and essential purposes of the Act. The
"activity rule" does just that.
The Court's division and the finely worded nature of both parts of
the opinion indicate something much larger about the state of insurance
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regulation. The insurance industry is sui generis, and many of the
traditional rules of antitrust law and business regulation in general
simply cannot apply. It is virtually impossible to argue that any single
form of regulation of insurance would be effective for the entire
industry. The Court's difficulty is reflective of the larger question:
How should insurance be regulated? The Court cannot agree, and
neither can anyone else. A review of the background of the McCarranFerguson Act and its judicial history leads almost inevitably to the
conclusion that the Act is not doing an effective job of dividing
regulation of the insurance industry between the states and the federal
government. Virtually no one is satisfied with the current state of
affairs.
In the almost half-century since the McCarran-Ferguson Act was
passed, a number of changes have occurred that call the purposes of
the Act into question. Insurance has become big business, far larger
than it was in 1945, with larger firms operating on a national and
international scale. Insurance has become far more integrated with
other financial services, including investment firms and banking, and
therefore has greater influence upon the rest of the economy than it did
in 1945. International firms, including firms from old enemies and
devastated allies of World War H, play a much larger role than they did
fifty years ago. Underwriting and actuarial techniques, enhanced by
computer technology, are far more sophisticated than in the "green eye
shade" days of the mid- 1940s. Moreover, the judicial and administrative treatment of the antitrust laws has changed dramatically since the
end of World War II.
In this current climate, there appears to be no good reason to
provide a blanket exemption from the antitrust laws for virtually all
activities of the insurance industry. The purposes of the exemption
were initially three-fold: (1) to protect property and liability carriers
from antitrust exposure for a number of information and rate-sharing
activities; (2) to protect existing state legislative schemes; and (3) to
forestall federal regulation under the activist Roosevelt administration.3" The protection of existing state legislative schemes is not, by
itself, a satisfactory reason for the continuation of McCarranFerguson. Similarly, mere fear of federal power should not be a basis
for policy. This sort of jealous self-protection and automatic response
is the stuff of ideology, not policy. Federal regulation is not inherently
bad, nor is state regulation inherently good. A regulatory scheme
should instead be judged dispassionately and objectively with an eye to
300. Weller, supra note 28, at 590-91; see supra text accompanying note 30.
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the regulatory goals.
Certainly, the need to share information in the property and liability
insurance areas may require an exemption for that particular activity;
the burden to show the need for an exemption of other activities,
however, should be on those requesting the exemption. For example,
the antitrust exemption should not be extended to inter-industry
restraints of trade.3° Moreover, if the need for rating organizations
indeed compels exempting the "business of insurance" from federal
antitrust laws, a major question remains: Why does the exemption
apply to the entire insurance industry when it appears that only
property, casualty, and liability insurers need the broad-based
statistical data and cooperative actions? Apparently, life, health, and
specialty3 insurers could survive without the exemption. This query
demonstrates the McCarran-Ferguson Act's attempt to utilize one
regulatory scheme for all of the multifarious insurers and the obvious
lack of "fit" that results.
Among the difficulties inherent in the regulatory environment
encountered by today's insurance company is a complex state-by-state
regulatory scheme. National and international firms find that they
must comply with fifty different regulatory schemes. The different
approaches of the fifty states to regulation has resulted in a belief that
two very different kinds of regulatory extremism have taken place. On
one hand, it might be argued that the regulatory apparatus of some
states has been "captured" by the insurance industry, which then
ignores the needs of other constituencies, including consumers. On
the other hand, opponents fear that some other states' insurance
commissions have been "captured" by the other side-the consumer
advocates-who engage in "industrial lynching" of the insurance
community.
30 1. Cf. Weller, supra note 28, at 621-40. Weller argues that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act should not exempt (1) actions of insurance companies that adversely affect competition in another industry; or (2) providers of insured goods or services that restrain trade
in their own markets through the use of insurance. Id. at 622-24. An example of the
former would be agreements between insurance companies and specific vendors or
providers (e.g., auto glass repair shops, pharmaceutical companies, or health care
providers) to provide services to insured parties at specific rates. See id. at 622. An
example of the latter would be the establishment of captive insurance companies by
providers of a particular good or service (e.g., the establishment of a prescription
insurance program by pharmaceutical firms). See id. at 623. While these agreements do
not necessarily involve antitrust violations, no logical reason exists to exempt
possible antitrust violations simply because they may carry the broad label "insurance."
302. For example, one small company writes only "hole-in-one" insurance for golf
outings. There seems to be no logical reason for this company to be exempt from the
antitrust laws.
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There are, of course, many good examples of balanced regulatory
schemes, and true examples of capture by either the industry or
consumer advocates are probably quite rare and exaggerated by the
antagonists on both sides. In all likelihood, most states' regulatory
schemes are operated in a manner that reflects state values and
opinions. It has been conversely argued, of course, that federal
regulation is not the answer, and will result in-an overlay to state regulation, creating "a dual, duplicative, and potentially inconsistent system
of regulation. 30 3
State law is also simply unable to deal with international insurers in
any effective manner. Huge international firms, including both direct
writers, reinsurers, and retrocessional insurers are simply too large,
too complex, and too powerful for most states to control. Even the
federal government may not be able to deal with such firms. The most
important holding of Hartford Fire Insurance may indeed be Justice
Souter's opinion that international insurance firms are subject to the
federal antitrust laws if there is conduct that is intended to, and which
34
in fact does, produce some substantial effect in the United States. 0
The case was somewhat close, however, and only one vote stood
between Justice Souter's view and Justice Scalia's complete surrender
of federal antitrust scrutiny of foreign insurers in all cases in which
foreign law conflicts with American law.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was designed for a simpler time, one
that is gone forever. While federal regulation may not be the answer,
it should not be rejected in all instances. For example, the weight and
power of the federal government may be necessary to provide a level
playing field for domestic and international firms and to prevent
foreign firms from bullying domestic insurers through reinsurance or
retrocessional insurance transactions. Similarly, the federal role over
areas that demand uniformity, such as insurer solvency, must be
expanded. On the other hand, state law should retain its traditional
role for many aspects of insurance, including regulation of brokers and
sales agents, small local firms, and local underwriting problems. In
other areas, it may be possible to adopt state compacts or uniform laws
that provide uniformity between states while retaining state hegemony
over an area. If Congress chooses to exercise federal regulatory
power through the continued application of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, however, it should carefully consider some of the judicially
created rules that now apply to the Act. For example, the activity rule
303. Melendez, supra note 28, at 304.
304. See supra text accompanying note 282.
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applied in HartfordFire Insurance should be retained and perhaps even
strengthened by statutory adoption.
A third alternative may also be useful for some forms of insurance
regulation. Uniform state laws, adopted through a variety of techniques, may provide the necessary uniformity and flexibility. Such
laws may be adopted through interstate cooperation, in a manner akin
to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, 0 5 through some
interstate compact, 306 or as a result of federal mandates.
The incredibly variegated world of insurance cannot be effectively
regulated in any single way. None of the three forms-federal, state,
or state-cooperative-will work for all areas. It is time to critically
examine McCarran-Ferguson once again for the benefit of both the
insurers and the insured. Such a re-examination must also reject kneejerk responses. A creative, flexible, and rational system of regulation
can be devised, sharing power between the federal government where
necessary and the states where possible. The HartfordFireInsurance
case may provide the catalyst for reasoned and constructive change,
that will put to rest fifty years of inefficiency and irrationality.
Insurance and financial services are certain to remain among the
largest and most lucrative of the global service industries for many
decades to come. It is time to create a system of regulation that
adequately protects consumers and which allows for industry growth,
development, and freedom of action. It is time to put aside an
antiquated law that has no relation to realities of the marketplace.

305. See L. H. Otis, Congressman Backs State Compact Plan, NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER (PROPERTY & CASUALTY/RISK BENEFITS MANAGEMENT EDITION), Aug. 23,

1993, at 3.
306. See Cynthia Crosson, NAIC Model Laws Pass in New Jersey, NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER (PROPERTY & CASUALTY/RISK BENEFITS MANAGEMENT EDITON), Aug. 16,
1993, at 3. This twelve-bill package permits accreditation by the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners, and includes bills covering financial solvency oversight,
reinsurance regulation, life risked-based capital and other areas. Id. at 31. The law failed
in New York, presumably because "the legislators would not tolerate having unelected
state regulators tell them what laws they have to pass." Id.

